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Article 
Paternalism or Gender-Neutrality? 
STEPHEN J. WARE 
The strong and widely accepted reasons for using gender-neutral language 
presumptively apply to the gendered word paternalism and its gender-neutral 
counterpart, parentalism. With these reasons in mind, this Article’s thesis is that 
legal scholars should begin with a presumption for using the gender-neutral word 
parentalism, while using paternalism only when emphasizing the important 
relevance of gender or otherwise trying to convey a gendered meaning. 
Accordingly, many legal scholars define paternalism in an expressly gendered 
way—such as “the institutionalization of male dominance,” or an “ideology [that] 
teaches men to minimize women’s agency”—or fittingly use paternalism to describe 
an attitude especially characteristic of men or directed primarily toward women. 
All these many uses of the gendered word paternalism are supported by the writers’ 
apparent intent to emphasize the important relevance of gender to the writers’ 
points. 
On the other hand, and despite the spread of gender-neutral language 
throughout our society and legal profession, many legal scholars continue to use 
the gendered word paternalism without indicating any important relevance of 
gender or otherwise manifesting intent to convey a gendered meaning. These many 
writers use paternalism rather than parentalism to describe laws or policies aiming 
to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their choices. For example, these 
writers cite “paternalism” as a standard justification for restrictions on contractual 
choice or other private ordering, including the unconscionability doctrine, usury 
laws, the minimum wage, and countless regulations limiting the range of 
enforceable promises by consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and others.  
In each of these contexts, it is better to use the gender-neutral word 
parentalism, unless the writer emphasizes the relevance of gender or otherwise 
manifests an intent to convey a gendered meaning. For example, a writer could 
justify using the gendered word paternalism by arguing that all our laws are 
gendered male so gendered language should be used to discuss any law, including 
using paternalism to describe laws aiming to protect people of all genders by 
restricting their choices. Or a writer could justify using the gendered word 
 
paternalism by arguing (after citing sufficient empirical data) that 
protect-by-restricting-choice parenting is gendered male, so analogous 
protect-by-restricting-choice laws and policies are also gendered male. Absent one 
of those two plausible arguments justifying use of the gendered word paternalism, 
laws or policies aiming to protect people of all genders by restricting their choices 
are better described as examples of parentalism.  
In short, a presumption for using the gender-neutral word parentalism to 
describe laws or policies aiming to protect people of all genders by restricting their 
choices is well-grounded in the strong and widely-accepted reasons for ordinarily 
using gender-neutral language. And examining legal scholarship’s many uses of 
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Paternalism or Gender-Neutrality? 
STEPHEN J. WARE * 
INTRODUCTION 
Paternalism’s relation to gender memorably impressed me as a law 
student listening to my classmate respond to our Contracts professor’s 
question. As my classmate argued for a broad unconscionability doctrine to 
protect vulnerable parties from potentially harsh contract terms, she 
characterized her own argument as “paternalist” and then, mid-thought, 
stopped herself and said something like “I guess coming from me it would 
actually be a ‘maternalist’ argument.” She made what many lawyers would 
call a paternalist argument, but evidently thought that since she was making 
the argument it was perhaps better characterized as maternalist. 
Perhaps inspired by that law school classmate, and definitely guided by 
a presumption in favor of gender-neutral language, a 1998 law review article 
of mine used the word parentalist where many others would have used 
paternalist—as a description of “laws that take discretion away from the 
consumer” to protect the consumer.1 This use of the gender-neutral 
parentalist where others would have used the gendered paternalist was 
unusual, but not unprecedented, in legal scholarship. For instance, Ian Ayers 
and Robert Gertner had previously referred to “parentalism” as the 
justification for rules “displac[ing] freedom of contract . . . [to] protect [] 
parties within the contract.”2 And Marcy Strauss had written that 
                                                                                                                     
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Thanks to Elizabeth Kronk 
Warner, Kyle Velte, Melanie DeRousse, Franciska Coleman, Lua Yuille, Chris Drahozal, Nancy Darling, 
Susan McHale, Jennifer Lansford, David Lancy, Lenore Skenazy, and participants at a Widener 
University Commonwealth Law School faculty workshop for comments. Thanks also to Bridget Brazil, 
Matthew Frederick, Munzer Islam, Nick Slovikoski, Ariel Rhines, Alisha Peters, Amanda Feriante, 
Justin Worthington, and Brandi Spates for research assistance. 
1 Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist 
Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 214 n.97 (1998) (“Who is to say what 
information a consumer should acquire before making a decision? Contract law leaves that up to the 
consumer who can decide how much time and money to invest in the acquisition of information. 
Mandatory disclosure laws take that discretion away from the consumer. Far from fostering autonomy, 
mandatory disclosure laws are ‘parentalist’ restrictions on autonomy.”). 
2 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989) (“Put most simply, immutable rules are justifiable if society 
wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties outside the contract. The former justification 
turns on parentalism; the latter on externalities. Immutable rules displace freedom of contract. 
Immutability is justified only if unregulated contracting would be socially deleterious because parties 
internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves.”). See also Rob Atkinson, 
Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 523 n.73 (1990) (“I say ‘parentalism’ rather 
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“[p]arentalism is roughly defined as ‘interference with a person’s liberty of 
action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, 
happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced.’”3 
Professor Strauss added that “[t]he term paternalism is sex-linked; it is 
drawn from the role of the father in the family. Parentalism reflects, in a 
more egalitarian fashion, the same principles.”4  
In that egalitarian spirit, a 2017 article of mine used parentalist similarly 
in a draft.5 However, the very capable Harvard Law School student editors 
objected: “If [‘parentalist’] is going to be in here, it absolutely needs some 
explanation of why a ‘gender-neutral’ form of paternalist is necessary here, 
because ‘paternalist’ is gendered for a reason . . . .”6 When asked for that 
reason, the editors wrote: “Paternalism is often used because it stems from 
male dominance and how men treat people, and thus carries a negative 
connotation.”7 
This 2017 view that negative connotations associated with male 
dominance warrant continued use of the gendered word paternalism perhaps 
contrasts with the view—expressed by Marcy Strauss in 1987—that using 
the gender-neutral parentalism, instead of paternalism, was laudably 
“egalitarian.”8 And this contrast may reflect broader generational differences 
across the thirty years from 1987 to 2017. On the other hand, this Article 
                                                                                                                     
than ‘paternalism’ in part to avoid the latter term’s connotations of officious intermeddling, but primarily 
to use a gender-neutral synonym. At least in my own experience, concern for another’s welfare combined 
with a claim of superior insight into the other’s needs can come from a parent of either sex.”). 
3 Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for 
Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 321 (1987) (“The main justification offered for attorney decisionmaking 
is based on parentalistic assumptions. Parentalism is roughly defined as ‘interference with a person’s 
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests 
or values of the person being coerced.’ Thus, the attorney, as parentalist, ‘claims to act on the (client’s) 
behalf, but not at that person’s behest; indeed, the “beneficiary” of paternalist action may even explicitly 
repudiate those actions on his behalf.’ Parentalism in the legal profession is based on a belief that 
nonattorneys are inherently incapable of making informed judgments, and thus need a professional to 
decide what legal alternatives are best for them. The attorney may even override the client’s wishes for 
what the attorney believes is in the client’s benefit.”). 
4 Id. at 321 n.34; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. 
L. REV. 963, 987 (1986–87) (“[C]ondemnation of paternalism (parentalism) in modern writing on ethics 
in the professions is the product of the lonely-individual doctrine in philosophical ethics, and of the 
philosophical distinction between fact and value, particularly in its disposition to turn the parental 
metaphor into a moral principle.”). 
5 Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, 23 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 113–14 (2017) (“[E]ven consumers who have no complaint with their treatment by 
a business may have been harmed by the business’s violations of law, but not realize it. So discovering 
and deterring such violations is an important role for the plaintiffs’ lawyers who bring class actions, and 
enforcing class waivers hurts consumers who do not realize they would benefit from a class action. Jean 
Sternlight, for example, opposes enforcement of arbitral class waivers in part on this paternalist (or 
‘parentalist’) ground.”); see also id. at 114 n.280 (“I prefer ‘parentalist’ to ‘paternalist,’ . . . , but that 
gender neutrality does not seem to have caught on.”). 
6 On file with Author. 
7 On file with Author.  
8 Strauss, supra note 3, at 321 n.34.  
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argues that each view—for and against using the gendered word 
paternalism—is strong within its field. Specifically, this Article’s thesis is 
that legal scholars should use the gendered word paternalism when they 
want to emphasize the relevance of gender—including, perhaps especially, 
male dominance—or otherwise convey a gendered meaning, but they should 
use the gender-neutral parentalism when they do not articulate any 
important relevance to gender, as they often do not in scholarship on contract 
and related areas of law. 
This Article’s argument about when to use each word—paternalism or 
parentalism—is both supported by widely-established good practices and 
illuminatingly novel. This argument for using the gender-neutral word 
parentalism is supported by widely-established good practices because it is 
well-grounded in the strong and widely-accepted reasons for ordinarily 
using gender-neutral language. To its credit, legal scholarship has over the 
last several decades largely adopted gender-neutral language, except when 
writers want to convey a gendered meaning. At one level, this Article’s 
argument is a fairly straightforward application of the prevailing view that 
gendered words tend to convey gendered meanings. So, we lawyers should 
use a gendered word (here, paternalism) when we intend a gendered 
meaning, but should otherwise use gender-neutral language (here, 
parentalism). 
While that is a fairly straightforward argument for consistency—for 
using paternalism and parentalism consistently with our other choices 
between gendered and gender-neutral language—it is also an illuminating 
argument. It illuminates our understandings of gender in both law and 
parenting. For example, as a parent of an energetically impulsive toddler, I 
frequently restricted my child’s choices because I cared for him and was 
trying to protect him. While I often allowed him to choose which direction 
to walk on the grass or sidewalk, I did not allow his choice to run into the 
street before checking for oncoming cars. He made this dangerous choice 
several times, and each time I grabbed him by the arm to prevent him from 
running into the street. Was my restriction of his choice paternalist because 
I was his father and acting typically of fathers? Or was my restriction of his 
choice parentalist because I was his parent and acting typically of parents? 
I believe the latter because I believe nearly all parents of any gender would 
restrict their toddlers much as I restricted mine. Restricting another person’s 
choice as a way to protect that person is part of parenting, not just part of 
fathering, or just part of mothering.9 But gender differences in such 
                                                                                                                     
9 The amount and contexts of such protect-by-restricting-choice parenting varies within and across 
societies and time periods, as, for example, parents restricting children’s “screen time” changes with 
technology. See, e.g., Anya Kamenetz, A Guide to Parental Controls for Kids’ Tech Use, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (June 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/18/620005246/a-guide-to-parental-
controls-for-kids-tech-use (“Ben Zimmerman lives in a suburb of Chicago. Like a lot of 9-year-olds, he’s 
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parenting may be relevant, so this Article addresses the possibility that 
empirical studies of such differences show that restricting children to protect 
them is gendered—that is, more common among fathers than mothers, or 
vice versa.10 
Distinct from parents (and others) trying to protect children by 
restricting children’s choices is the phenomenon of men restricting women’s 
choices. When that is the sense in which a writer uses paternalism, the 
gendered word fits because the writer conveys a gendered meaning and 
emphasizes gender’s important relevance. Accordingly, many contemporary 
legal scholars use paternalism in an expressly gendered way, such as by 
defining it as an “ideology [that] teaches men to minimize women’s 
agency,”11 or using it more broadly to refer to an attitude especially 
characteristic of men or an attitude directed primarily toward women.12 
These writers appropriately use a gendered word when making statements 
emphasizing gender’s important relevance. 
In contrast, many legal scholars continue to use the gendered word 
paternalism without any apparent intent to convey a gendered meaning. 
Legal scholars do this when discussing laws or policies aiming to protect 
people (of all genders) by restricting their choices. While gender may be 
relevant to any legal issue, much legal scholarship does not emphasize or 
even mention any relevance to gender. For instance, without mentioning 
gender, several scholars—including leaders in the economic analysis of 
law—say the “standard justifications for mandatory restrictions on freedom 
of contract are to protect people inside (paternalism) or outside 
(externalities) the contract.”13 And without mentioning gender, many legal 
scholars cite paternalism as a standard justification for restrictions on 
contractual choice, such as the unconscionability doctrine, usury laws, the 
minimum wage, and countless regulations limiting the range of enforceable 
                                                                                                                     
fond of YouTube, Roblox, and Minecraft. And, like a lot of parents, his mom and dad wanted to make 
sure Ben wasn’t spending too much time on those activities. They tried to use Google’s ‘Family Link’ 
parental control software to limit screen time.”). While in the contemporary United States, toddlers often 
receive environments “designed for their safety and parents are explicitly warned to ensure that activities 
like climbing stairs are closely supervised,” in traditional cultures, “good parents . . . let children do what 
we would see as patently dangerous things,” such as “playing with machetes, running barefoot through 
fires, and dragging around sharp pieces of rusty metal.” Such “parenting is guided by strongly held 
beliefs” like “[i]njury is a learning opportunity.” Nancy Darling, Where Toddlers Play with Knives: 
Parenting World Views, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 30, 2018), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/thinking-about-kids/201809/where-toddlers-play-knives-
parenting-world-views; see also David F. Lancy, Playing with Knives: The Socialization of Self-Initiated 
Learners, 87 CHILD DEV. 654, 655 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12498 (discussing the tolerance 
of children engaging in risky behavior as a form of socialization in certain cultures). 
10 See infra Section III.D.3. 
11 Courtney Fraser, From “Ladies First” to “Asking for It”: Benevolent Sexism in the Maintenance 
of Rape Culture, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 165 (2015). 
12 See infra Section II. 
13 See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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promises by consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and others.14 
Scholars in contract and related areas of law often use a non-gendered 
definition of paternalism under which “a policy counts as paternalistic if it 
is justified on the belief that it will make a person better off than if the person 
had been left to choose between the available options for him or herself.”15 
Such policies—restricting the choices of a “person” as likely to be a “him” 
as a “her”—are, this Article contends, better described as parentalist, unless 
the writer indicates any important relevance of gender and thus manifests 
the writer’s intent to convey a gendered meaning. 
This Article’s first section summarizes the strong and widely accepted 
reasons for ordinarily using gender-neutral language, except when seeking 
to convey a gendered meaning, as in the common practice of using gendered 
words like mother and woman when discussing pregnancy. Section I 
concludes that legal scholarship’s general presumption in favor of 
gender-neutral language, but gendered language when emphasizing gender 
to convey a gendered meaning, should be applied to paternalism, so we 
generally should use that gendered word when conveying a gendered 
meaning but should otherwise use the gender-neutral parentalism. 
Accordingly, Section II quotes and praises legal scholars’ gendered uses of 
paternalism—such as defining it in an expressly-gendered way or using it to 
describe an attitude especially characteristic of men or directed primarily 
toward women.  
In contrast, Section III quotes and criticizes legal scholars’ 
non-gendered uses of the word paternalism, such as citing “paternalism” as 
a standard justification for restrictions on contractual choice, including the 
unconscionability doctrine, usury laws, the minimum wage, and countless 
regulations limiting the range of enforceable promises by consumers, 
borrowers, employees, investors, and others. When law aims to protect 
vulnerable people by restricting their choices to form potentially harsh 
contracts, Section III contends, the reasons for ordinarily using 
gender-neutral language counsel for describing such law as parentalist 
rather than paternalist, unless the writer emphasizes the relevance of gender 
or otherwise manifests an intent to convey a gendered meaning. When a 
legal scholar wants to write in a gender-neutral way about law limiting 
freedom of contract to protect contracting parties of all genders, the rationale 
for those limits is presumptively better described with the gender-neutral 
word parentalism than the gendered word paternalism. However, Section 
III concludes by addressing several plausible arguments for using 
paternalism to describe such laws: (A) all laws are gendered male; (B) 
restricting people’s choices (even to protect those people) is gendered male; 
and (C) paternalism’s negative connotations attach to men.  
                                                                                                                     
14 See infra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
15 Jacob Goldin, Libertarian Quasi-Paternalism, 82 MO. L. REV. 669, 669 (2017). 
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Section IV quotes and praises many legal scholars already doing what 
this Article advocates—using parentalism rather than paternalism to 
describe laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their 
choices. Section IV acknowledges that other legal scholars use the word 
parentalist, in a very different context, to describe views about the primacy 
of parents (as opposed to government) in raising children. But Section IV 
concludes that these separate strands of legal scholarship using the word 
parentalist differently rarely produce confusion because context quickly 
clarifies any ambiguity. So, the case for parentalist as the gender-neutral 
replacement for paternalist is not significantly weakened by a separate use 
of parentalist with a different meaning.  
The Conclusion reiterates this Article’s thesis that we should use the 
gendered word paternalism when emphasizing the important relevance of 
gender or otherwise manifesting an intent to convey a gendered meaning, 
but should otherwise use the gender-neutral parentalism. In particular, we 
should use the gender-neutral word parentalism to describe 
protect-by-restricting-choice laws, unless emphasizing the relevance of 
gender or otherwise manifesting an intent to convey a gendered meaning. 
The Conclusion reviews two plausible examples of a gendered meaning. 
One is that a writer could justify using the gendered word paternalism by 
arguing that all our laws are gendered male so gendered language should be 
used to discuss any law, including using paternalism to describe laws aiming 
to protect people of all genders by restricting their choices. Or a writer could 
justify using the gendered word paternalism by arguing (after citing 
sufficient empirical data) that protect-by-restricting-choice parenting is 
gendered male, so analogous protect-by-restricting-choice laws and policies 
are also gendered male. Absent one of those two plausible arguments 
justifying use of the gendered word paternalism, this Article concludes, laws 
or policies aiming to protect people of all genders by restricting their choices 
are better described as examples of parentalism. 
I. THE CASE FOR GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE, EXCEPT WHEN 
CONVEYING A GENDERED MEANING 
Language matters. The words we use, and the meanings we attach to 
those words, reflect our thoughts, but they also influence our thoughts and 
thus our behavior. This power of words to influence is central to scholars of 
linguistics and rhetoric,16 as well as to practitioners of rhetoric, like lawyers. 
                                                                                                                     
16 John A. Lucy, Linguistic Relativity, 26 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 291, 292 (1997) (describing 
the ways within the field of linguistics that language is believed to influence thought); Terrill Pollman, 
Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 
887, 900 (2002) (stating that “[t]he modern rhetorical view [is] that language is constitutive of thought”); 
M. Kienpointer, Whorf and Wittgenstein. Language, World View and Augmentation, 10 
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As one scientist puts it, “changing how people talk changes how they 
think.”17 Similarly, a mainstream textbook on legal writing says, “Language 
does not only reflect reality; it also influences our perceptions of reality. 
Language, therefore, may be a guiding force to effect changes in reality—in 
fact, language shapes reality.”18 That legal writing textbook—Legal Writing 
Style, by Antonio Gidi and Henry Weihofen—did not include that statement 
in its 1961 first edition. However, by its 1980 second edition, Legal Writing 
Style included part of that statement in the following passage: 
Avoid Sexist Expressions (When You Can) 
Does the use of the masculine gender to include the feminine 
invidiously imply male superiority? Some of us have become 
convinced that is does. Language does not only reflect reality; 
it also influences our perceptions of reality. Experiments have 
shown that generic statements of “man” evoke, to a 
statistically significant degree, images of males only, whereas 
corresponding statements that avoid using the word “man” 
evoke images of both males and females.19 
This contrast between gendered language and gender-neutral language 
is a paradigmatic example of words’ power to influence. And movement 
toward gender-neutral language is exemplified by the three editions of Legal 
Writing Style. The 1961 edition used gendered and even “sexist language,”20 
with phrases like:  
• “The lawyer must be more precise in his writing than 
almost anyone else”;21  
                                                                                                                     
ARGUMENTATION 475, 492 (1996) (referring to “the strong influence of language on thought and world 
view”). 
17 Lera Boroditsky, How Language Shapes Thought, 304 SCI. AM. 62, 65 (2011) (referring to 
“demonstrations establishing that language indeed plays a causal role in shaping cognition. Studies have 
shown that changing how people talk changes how they think. Teaching people new color words, for 
instance, changes their ability to discriminate colors. And teaching people a new way of talking about 
time gives them a new way of thinking about it”). 
18 ANTONIO GIDI & HENRY WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE 23 (3d ed. 2018). See also Lucinda 
M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 887 (1989) (“Language . . . reflects the world views and chosen meanings 
of those who have had power to affect definitions and create terms. The selected terms and meanings 
then shape our understandings of what things are, of the way the world is.”). 
19 HENRY WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE 19 (2d ed. 1980). 
20 Greg Johnson, Welcome to Our Gender-Neutral Future, 42 VT. B.J. 36, 37 (2016) (“Henry 
Weihofen also says nothing about omitting sexist language in the first edition of his influential Legal 
Writing Style in 1961. Worse, when recommending varying word choice for the same term to ‘avoid 
ambiguity or excessive repetition,’ Weihofen argues that ‘the substitute should be only a substitute, and 
not an elegant sobriquet, such as “the weaker sex” for women, “Old Glory” for the flag, or “the staff of 
life” for bread.’ What is elegant about the sobriquet ‘the weaker sex’?!”). 
21 HENRY WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE 7 (1st ed. 1961). 
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• “A letter to a businessman has a different audience 
from one addressed to a workman with an eighth grade 
education”;22 and  
• “Some of a lawyer’s most important writings—briefs, 
for example—are written for busy men.”23 
In contrast, the 1980 second edition of Legal Writing Style includes the 
above exhortation to “Avoid Sexist Expressions (When You Can)” as part 
of a page and a half lesson on the topic. Going much further, the 2018 third 
edition of Legal Writing Style expands this lesson to eleven pages under the 
more absolute exhortation to “Use Gender-Neutral Language.”24  
This legal writing textbook’s evolution toward gender-neutral language 
paralleled a similar move toward gender-neutral language throughout our 
society during the latter part of the twentieth century.  
As professionals in various fields began to adopt it, 
gender-neutral language appeared in employment advertising, 
textbooks, popular media, dictionaries, and religious 
publications. Studies reported a decline in the use of masculine 
nouns and pronouns as generics, with one study finding a 
notable decline in their use in American newspapers and 
magazines between 1971 and 1979.25   
Examples of this move toward gender-neutral language include “chairman,” 
“mailman,” and “fireman” changing to the gender-neutral terms “chair,” 
“letter carrier,” and “firefighter,” while “male-female pairs like 
waiter-waitress and steward-stewardess” changed to “server” and “flight 
attendant.”26 
The move toward gender-neutral language very much includes the legal 
profession. As Judith Fischer recounts,  
[I]n the 1980s, a wave of gender task-force studies . . . 
examined various aspects of women and the law . . . . Some of 
the published reports proposed the use of gender-neutral 
language in statutes, judicial opinions, and other legal writing. 
                                                                                                                     
22 Id. at 5. 
23 Id. at 37. 
24 GIDI & WEIHOFEN, supra note 18, at 22–34. 
25 Judith D. Fischer, Framing Gender: Federal Appellate Judges’ Choices About Gender-Neutral 
Language, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 480–81 (2009). 
26 David Ludden, Talking Like It’s 1984, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 23, 2015), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/talking-apes/201503/talking-it-s-1984; see also Johnson, 
supra note 20, at 37 (“The drive to omit sexist language went mainstream in the 1980s and 1990s. We 
now say layperson instead of layman, business executive instead of businessman, reporter instead of 
newsman, worker’s compensation instead of workman’s compensation, and firefighter instead of 
fireman. Common idioms and figures of speech like ‘old wives’ tales’ are now considered sexist.”). 
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Some states adopted gender-neutral language in their 
constitutions, statutes, or other legal discourse, and sections on 
gender-neutral language began to appear in legal writing 
textbooks.27  
Fischer says, “these changes were based first of all on principles of 
fairness.”28 Gender-biased language “relegates girls and women to 
‘secondary status,’” and thus “not only reflects but also helps to construct 
and perpetuate a sexist reality.”29 “For example, feminist scholars have long 
decried that masculine generics are androcentric, and make women seem 
invisible . . . .”30 In contrast, gender-neutral language can “help construct a 
frame of the legal system that includes and empowers both genders.”31 In 
short, fairly including women—rather than relegating them to a less visible, 
secondary status below men—is a strong reason for gender-neutral 
language, and this reasoning has largely prevailed in the legal profession. 
An additional reason for gender-neutral language is to include people whose 
gender identity is nonbinary.32  
Nevertheless, legal scholars sensibly continue to use gendered language 
to convey a gendered meaning when emphasizing the important relevance 
of gender. For instance, legal scholars often continue to use gendered 
                                                                                                                     
27 Fischer, supra note 25, at 486. 
28 Id. 
29 Judith D. Fischer, The Supreme Court and Gender-Neutral Language: Splitting La Difference, 
33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 218, 221–22 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30 Jennifer L. Prewitt-Freilino et al., The Gendering of Language: A Comparison of Gender Equality 
in Countries with Gendered, Natural Gender, and Genderless Languages, 66 SEX ROLES 268, 270 (2011) 
(referring to “the power that asymmetries in lexical gender . . . can have on social gender stereotypes and 
inequities in status between men and women”). 
31 Fischer, supra note 25, at 487. See also Pat K. Chew & Lauren K. Kelley-Chew, Subtly Sexist 
Language, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 643, 643–44 (2007) (“Language can be a potent vehicle for subtle 
sexism. As lawyers, we understand the power of words. What we say and how we say it can perpetuate 
gender stereotypes and status differences between women and men. In contrast, language also can be 
used as a constructive tool for reinforcing equality.”); Michela Menegatti & Monica Rubini, Gender Bias 
and Sexism in Language, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA COMM. (Sept. 2017), 
https://oxfordre.com/communication/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228613-e-470?print=pdf (“In order to reduce gender bias, it is necessary to change people’s 
linguistic habits by making them aware of the beneficial effects of gender-fair expressions.”).  
32 See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 896 (2019) (“With 
stunning speed, nonbinary gender identities have gone from obscurity to prominence in American public 
life. The use of gender-neutral pronouns such as ‘they, them, and theirs’ to describe an individual person 
is growing in acceptance.” [People with nonbinary gender identities do not exclusively identify as men 
or women.]); Statement on Gender and Language, NAT’L COUNCIL TEACHERS ENG. (Oct. 25, 2018), 
http://www2.ncte.org/statement/genderfairuseoflang/ (“The most common concepts of gender are based 
on the long-perpetuated notion that gender is a binary matter, and that it always aligns with a binary 
designation of sex (male/female). Yet contemporary understandings of gender clarify that gender identity 
and expression occur along a broad spectrum that is not limited to two binary alternatives, such as 
woman/man or girl/boy. . . . The ‘Statement on Gender and Language’ (2018) . . . recommends usage 
that moves beyond the gender binary in order to include individuals whose identities might otherwise be 
unacknowledged or devalued.”).  
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language (such as “her,” “she,” “mother,” and “woman”) when discussing 
topics such as pregnancy,33 abortion,34 breastfeeding,35 and menstruation.36 
In sum, prevailing in our profession is a general presumption in favor of 
gender-neutral language, but use of gendered language when conveying a 
gendered meaning by emphasizing gender’s important relevance. This 
preference for gender-neutral language in general, but use of gendered 
language to convey a gendered meaning, is good and should be applied to 
the word paternalism and its gender-neutral counterpart, parentalism. That 
is, legal scholars generally37 should use the gendered word paternalism 
when they want to convey a gendered meaning by emphasizing the 
                                                                                                                     
33 Dara E. Purvis, The Rules of Maternity, 84 TENN. L. REV. 367, 371 (2017) (“Once a child is born, 
the mother’s choices such as the food she eats no longer impact her child in the same way, yet social 
expectations regarding mothers as primary caregivers extend the heightened surveillance of her behavior 
as a parent.”); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against 
Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 190 (2004) (“Pregnancy, like the high-pitched female voice, has no 
identical cross-sex parallel. . . . Because a pregnant woman could never show that she was being treated 
worse than a man with precisely the same trait, she could never show that adverse employment actions 
related to her pregnancy discriminated against her on the basis of sex.”); see also Rona Kaufman Kitchen, 
Holistic Pregnancy: Rejecting the Theory of the Adversarial Mother, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 
208 (2015) (“Rather than presuming the pregnant woman will act in the best interests of her pregnancy 
and of fetal life, the law assumes that she is hostile to her unborn child and identifies the State as better 
suited to protect pregnancy and fetal life.”); Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing Pregnancy, 92 IND. L.J. 
947, 965 (2017) (“A woman can be convicted of this crime if she ‘knowingly ingests, injects, consumes, 
inhales, or otherwise uses a narcotic drug or controlled substance without a prescription’ while she is 
pregnant or ‘knows or reasonably should have known’ she was pregnant.”). 
34 Jared H. Jones, Annotation, Women’s Reproductive Rights Concerning Abortion, and 
Governmental Regulation Thereof—Supreme Court Cases, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 8 (2007) (“[W]hen a minor 
becomes pregnant and considers an abortion, the relevant circumstances may vary widely depending 
upon her age, maturity, mental and physical condition, the stability of her home if she is not emancipated, 
and her relationship with her parents.”); Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial 
Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 76, 92 (2015) 
(“A rural woman may find it impossible to get an abortion if she must travel many hours to reach 
an abortion provider, especially if she has few transportation options, little money, or is otherwise 
constrained.”); Morgan Arnett, Comment, Update: Phasing Out Abortion: One Step Closer to 
Terminating a Woman’s Constitutional Right, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 597, 609 
(2007) (“Pro-choice supporters also believe that every child born into the world should be wanted: 
allowing abortions would reduce child abuse and neglect, so if a woman does not want to continue the 
pregnancy, she has options.”). 
35 Heather M. Kolinsky, Respecting Working Mothers with Infant Children: The Need for Increased 
Federal Intervention to Develop, Protect, and Support a Breastfeeding Culture in the United States, 17 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 333, 334 (2010) (“Legislation in nearly every state seeks to protect a 
woman’s right to breastfeed her child in any public place where she has a right to be.”). 
36 Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, 2017 
WIS. L. REV. 491, 516 (“A woman’s right to be free from discrimination is violated when menstrual 
hygiene products are subject to sales tax when there are no similar products that men must use because 
of an involuntary, biological monthly occurrence, and when the closest analogous products used 
primarily by men are not subject to taxation. Taxing products used primarily, or even exclusively, by 
women is to tax them on the basis of their sex, something which is prohibited by international human 
rights norms.”). 
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important relevance of gender, but otherwise should use the gender-neutral 
parentalism.  
II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP’S GENDERED USES OF THE WORD PATERNALISM 
A. Gendered Definitions of Paternalism 
It is fitting that legal scholars use the gendered word “paternalism” when 
apparently intending to convey a gendered meaning. Paternalism came into 
the English language as a gendered word—from the Latin word for father, 
“pater.”38 Paternalism literally means “to act like a father or treat another as 
a child.”39  
With its roots in the notion of fatherhood and acting like a 
father, “paternalism” means making decisions on others’ 
behalf to protect them from harm or to advance their 
well-being. Although the motivation for paternalistic 
intervention may be altruistic, it inevitably involves an 
element of autonomy-deprivation for the “protected” party.40  
Paternalism’s etymology  
reflects the implicit social hierarchies of patriarchal cultures, 
in which fathers or male heads of families were understood to 
be authority figures responsible for the welfare of subordinates 
and dependents. In this tradition, adult members of states, 
corporations, and communities functioned under the 
presumably benevolent authority of kings, presidents, and 
executives.41  
Questioning this presumption of benevolence in kings, Locke cautioned 
against confounding “paternal” and “political” power; and Kant similarly 
warned that “the worst conceivable despotism” would be government 
“founded on the principle of benevolence toward the people, as a father’s 
toward his children—in other words, . . . paternalistic government 
(imperium paternale).”42  
                                                                                                                     
38 2 PETER SUBER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 632 (Christopher Berry Gray ed., 
1st ed. 1999); Lindsay J. Thompson, Paternalism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 23, 2013), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/paternalism.   
39 2 SUBER, supra note 38, at 632. 
40 Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and 
Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 889. 
41 Thompson, supra note 38; see also Edward A. Fallone, Charters, Compacts, and Tea Parties: 
The Decline and Resurrection of a Delegation View of the Constitution, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1067, 
1091 (2010) (referring to “[t]raditional notions of sovereignty that had long viewed the king as a 
paternalistic father figure”). 
42 IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT WON’T WORK IN 
PRACTICE 58–59 (E.B. Ashton trans., 1974) (1793) (emphasis omitted); Thaddeus Mason Pope, 
 
 
552 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
Consistent with the gendered origin and history of the word paternalism, 
many contemporary legal scholars continue to define the word in an 
expressly gendered way. For instance, law review articles over the last 
fifteen years have defined paternalism as “the institutionalization of male 
dominance,”43 or an “ideology [that] teaches men to minimize women’s 
agency.”44 Similarly using paternalistic to describe policies reinforcing male 
dominance or privilege, one law review article refers to “paternalistic 
sentiments in which men are deemed rulers of their households,”45 and other 
articles say:  
• “The paternalistic mechanisms supporting 
colonialism and empire abroad transferred as a model 
to the paternalistic family at home, serving to both 
create and reinforce it. This privileging of the 
dominant group over others . . . constituted white male 
authority over both family and community”;46 
• “This regime of guardianship is completely 
paternalistic, favoring males and neglecting females 
entirely”;47 and 
• “[D]eferential review of gender classifications 
mirrored the paternalistic views of a male-dominated 
society.”48 
These articles quite sensibly use a gendered word—paternalism or 
paternalistic—to convey a gendered meaning, that is, a meaning about male 
                                                                                                                     
Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
659, 681–83 (2004) (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 2D TREATISE §§ 52–53, at 
170 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1698)). 
43 Stephen Paul Kennedy, Sex, Power, and the Claims of Virtue Reflection on the Indefensibility of 
Sexual Harassment, 14 TRINITY L. REV. 29, 59 (2007) (describing “paternalism” as “the 
institutionalization of male dominance”). See also Gila Stopler, “A Rank Usurpation of Power”–The 
Role of Patriarchal Religion and Culture in the Subordination of Women, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 365, 380 (2008) (“Dominance is disguised as benevolence, and sexism—the ideology of male 
supremacy and superiority over women—serves as the ‘factual’ basis that explains to women why they 
need this form of paternalism while simultaneously allowing men to convince themselves that they are 
only acting in everyone’s, especially women’s, best interests.”). 
44 Fraser, supra note 11, at 165 (“[P]aternalistic ideology teaches men to minimize women’s agency 
. . . .”). 
45 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 
207, 261 (2010). 
46 See Deborah Anthony, Analyzing the Disappearance of Women’s Surnames and the 
Retrenchment of their Political-Legal Status in Early Modern England, 29 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 7, 
23 (2018). 
47 Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 1, 68–69 (2006). 
48 Donald E. Lively & Ellen S. Podgor, Reckoning with the Bluster of Apolitical Jurisprudence, 19 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715, 718–19 (1992). 
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dominance or privilege. And these articles may not all presume men’s 
benevolence toward women—that men consistently try to use their 
dominance or privilege for women’s good49—any more than Locke and Kant 
presumed royal benevolence toward subject people—that kings consistently 
try to use their dominance or privilege for the good of their subjects. 
B. Paternalism as Attitude Especially Characteristic of Men 
Also consistent with the gendered origin and history of the word 
paternalism, legal scholars often continue to use the gendered words 
paternalism and paternalistic to refer to an attitude especially characteristic 
of men. For instance, one article in a legal journal refers to “the way 
well-meaning white men might paternalistically treat women and 
minorities,”50 and others say: 
• “Paternalism in medical practice was practiced by 
male physicians on male and female patients alike”;51 
• Sex discrimination “likely reflected a paternalistic 
view, promoted by men, that the legal state of affairs 
benefitted both sexes”;52 and 
• “[E]lective share laws are terribly demeaning and 
paternalistic to women. Male-dominated legislatures, 
though, continue to perpetuate belittling female 
stereotypes by saying through elective share laws that 
women are so incompetent and unable to stand up for 
themselves that the ‘little missies’ still must be 
protected by some ancient magical sword.”53 
                                                                                                                     
49 See Jessica Knouse, Mandatory Ultrasounds and the Precession of Simulacra, 54 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 117, 139 (2017) (“[Women] are subordinated by the inherent paternalism [of mandatory 
ultrasounds]; they are manipulated by the compromised informed consent procedure and inherent pro-life 
bias . . . .”); Catherine London, Note, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy 
Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 405 (2012) (referring to an “attempt by the paternalistic, 
male-dominated medical establishment to exploit women’s reproductive capabilities to serve its own 
interests”); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2087 (2003) (“[M]ale bosses 
reinforce paternalistic authority by harassing or belittling women in traditionally female fields who dared 
to step out of their proper place.”). 
50 Melissa Mortazavi, The Cost of Avoidance: Pluralism, Neutrality, and the Foundations of 
Modern Legal Ethics, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 151, 187 (2014). 
51 Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing the Hippocratic Oath, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 
77, 130 (1993). 
52 Charles R. Calleros, Advocacy for Marriage Equality: The Power of a Broad Historical Narrative 
During a Transitional Period in Civil Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1249, 1297. 
53 Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to Whomever I Choose 
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In each of these uses of the word paternalism, the paternalists are 
exclusively or mostly men, so a gendered word fits. These scholars sensibly 
use a gendered word, paternalism, to convey gendered meanings.  
C. Women as Especially Likely Objects of Paternalism 
The previous section praises use of the gendered word paternalism to 
refer to an attitude especially characteristic of men. Also praiseworthy is the 
use of this gendered word when the writer emphasizes women as especially 
likely objects of this “paternalistic” attitude. Such articles are numerous. 
Several of them address pregnancy:  
• “[P]regnancy, like traditional disabilities, has often 
led to paternalistic policies excluding pregnant 
women from paid work and other aspects of public 
life”;54  
• “[F]eminists have . . . challenge[d] the idea, steeped in 
paternalism, that pregnant women need to be treated 
as if infirm or in need of protection”;55 
• “[F]eminists were able to document and bring voice to 
workplace paternalism that had systematically 
excluded and punished pregnant women”;56 
• “Imposing more stringent regulations on pregnant 
women is based on paternalistic notions that value the 
protection of the fetus over the pregnant woman’s 
health, autonomy, and well-being”;57 
• “[T]he pending Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, 
which would secure an asymmetric, 
pregnancy-specific right to workplace 
accommodations” “may revitalize exclusionary and 
paternalistic attitudes toward pregnant employees, 
signal an incapacity to work, and increase sex 
discrimination”;58  
                                                                                                                     
54 Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 443, 476 (2012). 
55 Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, Law, and Culture, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
457, 508 (2013). 
56 Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis of the 
ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 17 (2012). 
57 Greer Donley, Encouraging Maternal Sacrifice: How Regulations Governing the Consumption 
of Pharmaceuticals During Pregnancy Prioritize Fetal Safety over Maternal Health and Autonomy, 39 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 48 (2015). 
58 Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1085, 1114–15 (2017). 
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• “[F]eminists’ concerns that permitting healthy 
pregnant workers to argue they have ADA disabilities 
would revive exclusionary and paternalistic attitudes 
toward pregnancy”;59 and 
• “To argue that surrogates, who willingly enter a 
contract, can no longer be held to their good faith 
agreement because of the intervening distress of 
pregnancy, reinforces a sense of paternalism—
minimizing women’s decision-making capabilities 
due to supposed hormonally-induced unpredictability. 
Surrogacy contracts should be held to the same 
requirements under the law as all other contractual 
agreements.”60 
Pregnancy is not the only context in which writers sensibly use the 
gendered word paternalism in emphasizing women as especially likely 
objects of a “paternalistic” attitude. Other such contexts appear in the 
following examples: 
• “[R]equiring only girls and young women to be 
vaccinated against HPV . . . discriminates against 
women because it assumes that they, unlike men, need 
protection and paternalism”;61  
• “Opponents to the requirement of women registering 
[for the draft] espoused paternalistic views on women 
not serving in combat”;62 
• “Judicial paternalism posits that judges (as well as 
other court officials such as prosecutors and probation 
officers) view females as weak and in need of 
protection from the harsh environments of jails and 
prisons”;63 
• “Although paternalism has occasioned favorable 
outcomes for individual women in the criminal justice 
                                                                                                                     
59 Cox, supra note 54, at 473. 
60 Julia Dalzell, The Enforcement of Selective Reduction Clauses in Surrogacy Contracts, 27 
WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 83, 122 (2018). 
61 Linda C. Fentiman, Sex, Science, and the Age of Anxiety, 92 NEB. L. REV. 455, 503 (2014). 
62 Renee Just, Note, GI Jane: A Comparison of the Legal Framework for Women’s Military Service 
in Israel and the United States, 8 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 165, 176–77 (2017). 
63 Mirko Bagaric & Brienna Bagaric, Mitigating the Crime That Is the Over-Imprisonment of 
Women: Why Orange Should Not Be the New Black, 41 VT. L. REV. 537, 590 n.346 (2017) (quoting Ann 
Martin Stacey & Cassia Spohn, Gender and the Social Costs of Sentencing: An Analysis of Sentences 
Imposed on Male and Female Offenders in Three U.S. District Courts, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 43, 49–
51 (2006) (internal footnotes omitted)).  
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system, it has been defined by feminists as ultimately 
harmful, because the protection afforded women is 
based on their presumed inferiority; women are, 
therefore, less than fully adult, when ‘adult’ is 
synonymous with ‘male.’ This paternalism spared 
women’s lives, but it cannot be read uncritically as 
leniency”;64 
• “[P]aternalistic views about women’s health cause the 
FDA to either underestimate the morbidity treated by 
a women’s health product or overestimate the risks 
posed by the drug”;65 
• “The status of motherhood at present is to be 
subordinated to paternalistic assessments of what is 
best for children”;66 
• “[T]he paternalistic world in which these women 
often feel trapped—a world that finds their sole value 
in childbearing”;67 
• “Women summoned the state to challenge patriarchal 
norms and power arrangements but then found 
themselves subject to new forms of paternalism”;68 
• “As enforced, the persistence of the regulation of 
prostitution may indeed owe to paternalistic state 
denial of women’s ownership over their bodies”;69 
• “Paternalism reflects a lack of respect for autonomy 
and for the individual as a person. A number of the 
policies adopted to address domestic violence—
policies championed by many advocates for women 
who have been battered—are guided by what seems to 
be patently paternalistic views of these women as 
                                                                                                                     
64 Lynsey Black, “On the Other Hand the Accused Is A Woman . . .”: Women and the Death Penalty 
in Post-Independence Ireland, 36 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 170 (2018) (footnotes omitted). 
65 Mara Sanders, Note, Sex, Drugs, and Advisory Committees: An Analysis of Pharmaceutical 
Industry Manipulation of FDA Vulnerability to Sociopolitical Influences on Matters of Women’s Health, 
48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 166–67 (2017). 
66 Dara E. Purvis, The Rules of Maternity, 84 TENN. L. REV. 367, 440 (2017). 
67 Torrey McConnell, Note, The War on Women: The Collateral Consequences of Female 
Incarceration, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2017). 
68 Jennifer Carlson & Kristin A. Goss, Gendering the Second Amendment, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 103, 120 (2017). 
69 V. Noah Gimbel, Note, Fetal Tissue Research & Abortion: Conscription, Commodification, and 
the Future of Choice, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 229, 278 (2017). 
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powerless, limited individuals incapable of acting on 
their own behalf”;70 and 
• “[Women] are subordinated by the inherent 
paternalism [of mandatory ultrasounds]; they are 
manipulated by the compromised informed consent 
procedure and inherent pro-life bias . . . .”71 
In all these uses of the word paternalism, the writers emphasize women 
as the objects of paternalist attitudes or policies. So, these writers’ uses of 
the gendered word paternalism are supported by the good reason that they 
are conveying gendered meanings.  
D. Paternalism as an Attitude Especially Characteristic of Men and 
Directed Primarily Toward Women 
The previous two sections quote and praise legal articles’ uses of the 
gendered word paternalism when writers apparently intend to convey a 
gendered meaning by emphasizing the important relevance of gender. This 
Section quotes articles combining these gendered meanings, that is, using 
paternalism to refer to an attitude especially characteristic of men and 
directed primarily toward women. 
For example, several articles use paternalism to describe the attitudes of 
male judges, as compared to female judges, toward women convicted of 
crimes. One such article refers to “[e]vidence of a paternalistic bias among 
male judges that favors female offenders” with lighter sentences.72 Another 
says, “theories of paternalism suggest leniency toward women arose out of 
an implied power dynamic in which male court authorities perceived female 
offenders as inferior to men both socially and legally.”73 A third notes, 
“[t]here is evidence that, as judges, women tend to be . . . less 
paternalistically forgiving than men to female offenders . . . .”74 A fourth 
says: “[S]ome have called judicial paternalism . . . the less stringent 
sentencing of female offenders by protective and paternalistic male judges . 
. . .”75 In all these uses of the word paternalism, the paternalists are men and 
                                                                                                                     
70 Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions 
in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2009) (footnotes omitted).  
71 Knouse, supra note 49, at 139. 
72 Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level 
Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 57, 63, 75, 80, 89–90 (2005). 
73 Amy Farrell, Geoff Ward & Danielle Rousseau, Intersections of Gender and Race in Federal 
Sentencing: Examining Court Contexts and the Effects of Representative Court Authorities, 14 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 85, 88–89 (2010). 
74 Ori Aronson, The Next Forty Presidents, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 235, 241 (2018).  
75 Haneefah A. Jackson, Note, When Love Is a Crime: Why the Drug Prosecutions and Punishments 
of Female Non-Conspirators Cannot Be Justified by Retributive Principles, 46 HOW. L.J. 517, 540 
(2003); see also Jody L. King, Avoiding Gender Bias in Downward Departures for Family 
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the objects of their paternalism are women, in this case women convicted of 
crimes. In short, these scholars fittingly use the gendered word paternalism 
to convey gendered meanings with gender relevant to their points about 
parties on each side of the paternalist relationship. 
Criminal sentencing is just one of several fields in which legal articles 
sensibly use the gendered word paternalism (or a variant like “paternalistic”) 
to refer to an attitude especially characteristic of men towards women. Other 
such articles refer to: 
• “[T]he paternalistic attitudes of male policy makers to 
women’s human rights”;76  
• “[A] ‘paternalistic’ attitude of male judges toward 
female plaintiffs in pregnancy discrimination cases”;77  
• An “attempt by the paternalistic, male-dominated 
medical establishment to exploit women’s 
reproductive capabilities to serve its own interests”;78  
• “[T]he paternalistic views of male physicians in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who declared 
themselves experts in childbirth and introduced a 
variety of interventions on the assumption that female 
weakness required pain medication and other 
interference with the body’s natural labor process”;79 
• “[T]raditional sexual paternalism, which dictates that 
men and women have different virtues, and in many 
realms, women need to be taken care of”;80 
• “[P]aternalistic views of the male duty to protect the 
so-called weaker sex”;81  
                                                                                                                     
Responsibilities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273, 287 (“Prior to 
the Guidelines, there was a wide-spread perception that women received preferential treatment in 
sentencing decisions. Such preferential treatment was believed to be grounded in the chivalry or 
paternalism of the predominantly male judiciary.” (footnotes omitted)). 
76 Debdatta Dobe, Note, Resolution 2122: The “Aborted” Debate, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 175, 211 
(2015). 
77 John C. Coughenour et al., The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the 
Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 887 (1994). 
78 London, supra note 49, at 405; see also Eugene Morgulis, Note, Juror Reactions to Scientific 
Testimony: Unique Challenges in Complex Mass Torts, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 252, 262 (2009) 
(asserting that “[m]edicine is male-dominated and paternalistic toward women”). 
79 Elizabeth Kukura, Obstetric Violence, 106 GEO. L.J. 721, 775–76 (2018).  
80 Kelly Sarabyn, Racial and Sexual Paternalism, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 553, 564 (2009). 
81 Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law 
Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 33, 41 (2010); see also Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of 
Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the Law, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 335, 345 (1992) 
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• “‘[M]en[,] accustomed to a paternalistic mode of 
thinking about women,’ who found it difficult to 
perceive how a special benefit to women actually 
harmed them”;82 
• “[W]eaknesses in current Supreme Court 
jurisprudence . . . which revived paternalistic 
ideologies associated with women’s capacity to 
reason, consent, and make autonomous reproductive 
healthcare decisions, because historically, the State 
and courts have been complicit in undermining 
women’s economic capacities and liberty interests”;83 
• “[Anti-polygamy] positions [that] bring together 
philosophies familiar from both the right and left—
paternalistic guidance about what’s best for women, 
and feminist articulations about the extent of women’s 
power in a society with strong patriarchal roots”;84  
• “[A] form of gender paternalistic reasoning, which 
like ‘the old gender paternalism’ is based on 
‘stereotypes about women’s capacity and women’s 
roles’ that serve to ‘deny women agency’ for the 
ostensible purpose of protecting them from coercion 
and/or freeing them to be mothers”;85 
• “[A] list of paternalistic qualifications that would 
draw quick constitutional invalidation today: 
‘Provided, however, That no female shall be given any 
task, disproportionate to her strength, nor shall she be 
                                                                                                                     
(“Especially for men accustomed to a paternalistic mode of thinking about women, it is difficult to grasp 
that a law which seems to give a special benefit to women actually harms her.”); Jessica L. Cornett, Note, 
The U.S. Military Responds to Rape: Will Recent Changes Be Enough?, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 99, 
115 (2008) (associating “[t]he pervasively male-dominated and paternalistic culture of the U.S. military” 
with “[v]iews such as women in uniform are inferior, which are reinforced by restrictions placed on 
women’s service opportunities”); Blake J. Furman, Note, Gender Equality in High School Sports: Why 
There Is a Contact Sports Exemption to Title IX, Eliminating It, and a Proposal for the Future, 17 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1169, 1178 (2007) (“[T]he rationale that females need to 
be protected from injury and male domination is overly paternalistic.”). 
82 Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 699, 728–29 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
83 Michele Goodwin & Meigan Thompson, In the Shadow of the Court: Strategic Federalism and 
Reproductive Rights, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 333, 337 (2017). 
84 See Sarah Rogozen, Note, Prioritizing Diversity and Autonomy in the Polygamy Legalization 
Debate, 24 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 144 (2017) (discussing the importance of true consent in 
polygynous marriages, and arguments against the presence of consent in such relationships).  
85 J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Ministering (In)justice: The Supreme Court’s Misreliance on Abortion 
Regret in Gonzales v. Carhart, 17 NEV. L.J. 599, 602 (2017). 
 
 
560 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
employed in any place detrimental to her morals, her 
health or her potential capacity for motherhood’”;86 
• “[G]ender discrimination statutes [that] 
paternalistically protected women and provided 
handicap benefits to women that were not shared by 
men”;87 and 
• “[S]ociety’s paternalistic view of women, not as 
workers, but as mothers and caregivers, dependent 
upon the financial largesse of their husbands, fathers, 
or brothers.”88 
Also sensibly using the gendered word paternalism to refer to an attitude 
especially characteristic of men towards women, other such articles say: 
• “Muslim women aroused a paternalist instinct in the 
still largely male [French] political leadership: to 
protect women and girls from their men, their religion, 
and its ‘archaic’ practices, [French] leaders 
interpreted France’s republican values, its valeurs 
républicaines, to exclude Muslim women’s dress”;89 
• “The fact that many of the cases Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
brought to the Court had male plaintiffs, challenging 
paternalistic laws that favored women in various 
government benefits, did not make the Court’s job any 
easier, because to the nine men of the Supreme Court, 
the premises behind these laws—that women tended 
to need protection and financial support more than 
men did—made a good deal of sense and seemed, at 
the least, well-intentioned if not carefully tailored”;90  
• “Male bosses reinforce paternalistic authority by 
harassing or belittling women in traditionally female 
fields who dared to step out of their proper place”;91 
                                                                                                                     
86 David Freeman Engstrom, “Not Merely There to Help the Men”: Equal Pay Laws, Collective 
Rights, and the Making of the Modern Class Action, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32 (2018). 
87 Gabrielle Fromer, Note, With Equal Opportunity Comes Equal Responsibility: The 
Unconstitutionality of a Male-Only Draft, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 173, 188 (2017). 
88 Thelma L. Harmon, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: The Equal Treatment Fallacy, 20 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 97, 99 (2017).  
89 Darren Rosenblum, Sex Quotas and Burkini Bans, 92 TUL. L. REV. 469, 475 (2017). 
90 Linda Greenhouse, Harry Blackmun, Independence and Path Dependence, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 
1235, 1242 (2005).  
91 Schultz, supra note 49, at 2087. 
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• “[T]he epitome of patriarchy and paternalism” is 
“[m]ostly male physicians encouraging healthy, fertile 
women to undergo procedures that will help infertile 
women, at a cost and risk unknown to the donor”;92 
• “Traditional male paternalism was the primary 
motivator of the decisions of male labor leaders to 
represent women”;93   
• “[W]hen a state chooses to reserve its harshest 
punishments for men, it offends society’s notions of 
justice and reinforces paternalistic stereotypes about 
women. As one editorialist put it, ‘[s]o long as 
paternalistic, doting men give their “little girls” equal 
rights but not equal responsibilities, we will continue 
to nurture deep hatred instead of understanding’”;94 
• “Both slaves and wives were once subject to the all 
encompassing paternalistic power of the male head of 
the house. Arguments justifying different treatment 
for the sexes on the grounds of female inferiority, need 
for male protection, and happiness in their assigned 
roles bear a striking resemblance to the half-truths 
surrounding the myth of the ‘happy slave’”;95 and 
• “[T]he Court rejected a paternalistic view of marriage 
and the decision to bear and beget a child when it 
explained that while a husband has an interest in his 
unborn child, he ‘has no enforceable right to require a 
wife to advise him before she exercises her personal 
choices . . . . A state may not give to a man the kind of 
dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their 
children.’”96 
                                                                                                                     
92 Kari L. Karsjens, Note, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and Patriarchy, 5 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 85 (2002).  
93 Catherine T. Barbieri, Comment, Women Workers in Transition: The Potential Impact of the 
NAFTA Labor Side Agreements on Women Workers in Argentina and Chile, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 526, 
534 (1996). 
94 Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1509–10 (1997) (second alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted). 
95 Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Note, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality, 12 LAW 
& INEQ. 381, 411 (1994) (quoting Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a 
Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (1971)). 
96 Sophia M. Suarez, Note, A Woman’s Right to Dignity: Equality, Liberty, and Abortion, 11 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIBERTY 470, 480 (2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992)). 
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All the articles quoted in this Section sensibly use the gendered word 
paternalism to convey a gendered meaning.  
E. Summary 
Section II began with the gendered origins of the word of paternalism, 
and then showed that a great many legal scholars continue to use the 
gendered word paternalism to convey a gendered meaning. Many legal 
scholars sensibly use this gendered word to describe policies reinforcing 
male dominance or privilege, an attitude especially characteristic of men, or 
an attitude directed primarily toward women. All these many uses of the 
gendered word paternalism are supported by the writers’ apparent intent to 
emphasize the important relevance of gender to the writers’ points. 
III. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP’S NON-GENDERED USES OF “PATERNALISM” 
A. Introduction 
While Section II praised legal scholars’ gendered uses of the word 
paternalism, this Section criticizes legal scholars’ non-gendered uses of 
paternalism. This Section contends that the widely accepted reasons for 
ordinarily using gender-neutral language (to avoid reducing women’s 
visibility or otherwise relegating women to secondary status) counsel against 
defining paternalism without reference to gender or using the word without 
mentioning any important relevance to gender or otherwise manifesting any 
intent to convey a gendered meaning. Counterarguments to these 
contentions are addressed at the end of this Section.  
B. Non-Gendered Definitions of “Paternalism” 
Many legal scholars continue to use the gendered word paternalism 
without indicating any important relevance of gender, and thus without any 
apparent intent to convey a gendered meaning. While gender may be 
relevant to any legal issue, much legal scholarship does not emphasize or 
even mention any relevance of gender. For instance, without mentioning 
gender in the relevant passages, or otherwise manifesting intent to convey a 
gendered meaning, several scholars, including leaders in the economic 
analysis of law, cite  “paternalism” as one of only two standard justifications 
for restricting freedom of contract or other private ordering: 
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• “The standard justifications for mandatory restrictions 
on freedom of contract are to protect people inside 
(paternalism) or outside (externalities) the contract”;97   
• “A liberal state has two basic rationales for regulating 
how individuals or groups use private property and 
enter into contracts: externalities and paternalism”;98 
and 
• “There are two justifications for mandatory 
rules: paternalism and externalities.”99 
Similarly, not mentioning gender in the relevant passages or otherwise 
manifesting intent to convey a gendered meaning, many legal scholars cite 
“paternalism” as a standard justification for restrictions on contractual 
choice, such as the unconscionability doctrine, usury laws, the minimum 
wage, and countless regulations limiting the range of enforceable promises 
by consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and others. For example, 
law review articles in recent decades say: 
                                                                                                                     
97 Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 
2084 (2012). As noted above, Ian Ayres deserves credit as one of legal scholarship’s pioneers in using 
parentalism rather than “paternalism,” Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 88, so it is unclear why his 2012 
Regulating Opt-Out article uses “paternalism,” especially as it exhibits gender-consciousness in passages 
unrelated to its use of “paternalism.” See Ayres, supra, at 2045 (“[O]nce we see that altering rules can 
be tailored to impose different altering requirements for different contracting parties, we can more easily 
identify instances where altering rules discriminate on the basis of race or gender.”); id. at 2046 
(“[E]xplicitly thinking about altering rules can illuminate unexamined aspects of gender discrimination . 
. . .”); id. at 2111 n.214 (“I speak of the spouses-to-be in gendered terms because at that time (as is sadly 
true today) my home state of Missouri did not see fit to extend equal marriage rights to same-sex 
couples.”). 
98 Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 
116 YALE L.J. 226, 267 (2006). This article includes thoughtful points about gender in passages unrelated 
to its use of “paternalism.” See id. at 252 (“[T]o the extent that tastes vary according to attributes such as 
social class, age, gender, and ethnicity, participants in a household relationship can be expected to show 
a tendency to cluster accordingly.”); id. at 317 (“Ambient norms concerning gender roles, particularly if 
they have been internalized, are likely to strongly influence the allocation of co-occupants’ tasks. By 
looking to customary gender roles for guidance about what gifts of labor to make, co-occupants can 
reduce their transaction costs of coordination.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 311 n.326 (“Critics of the gift 
exchange process among housemates assert that it systematically advantages the powerful, in particular 
men over women. . . . These critics do not accept, at least in the context of inter-gender relations, the 
premise that background legal and social conditions in the United States are liberal—that is, that 
occupants can use either voice or exit to avoid exploitation within the home.” (citations omitted)). 
99 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
515, 535 (1999). 
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• “Paternalism holds that restrictive contract doctrines 
are justified for striking down contracts entered by 
people against their own interests”;100 
• “Where incapacitation affects the borrower’s ability to 
participate in the marketplace effectively, paternalism 
remains a compelling reason for structuring 
lender-borrower relationships according to an 
objective standard”;101 
• “[O]ur current regulatory regime, from minimum 
wage and maximum hour laws to child labor laws and 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act are based on 
paternalism”;102 
• “The invalidity of contracts of peonage or 
self-enslavement, of agreements purporting to waive 
the promisor’s right to obtain a divorce or sue for 
relief under the bankruptcy laws, of provisions 
conferring on either party a right to specifically 
enforce their agreement (where no right of this sort 
exists as a matter of law); the voidability of most 
contracts made by infants; and the nonwaiveable 
‘cooling-off’ period imposed by law in many 
consumer transactions all also have, at least in part, a 
paternalistic objective”;103 and 
• “Federal securities regulation contains paternalistic 
features . . . . For example, no investor can be given 
the opportunity to purchase a security unless the 
                                                                                                                     
100 Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 296 (1995) 
(“It is hard to find defenders of such a position in the academic literature, but there is a widespread feeling 
among contract law scholars that paternalistic attitudes account for some judges’ use of the 
unconscionability doctrine in certain contract cases.” (footnote omitted)); see also Linda J. Ravdin, 
Premarital Agreements and the Uniform Acts, 39 FAM. ADVOC. 34, 36 (2017) (“The UPAA rejected as 
paternalistic the prevailing approach that permitted a judge to relieve a party of a bad bargain. The 
UPMAA rejects a return to pre-UPAA paternalism. It retains the unconscionability standard and the 
majority rule that unconscionability is determined as of execution.”). 
101 Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 151, 
158–59 (1988) (“Beyond the larger social interest at stake, the paternalism of usury serves a compelling 
interest in the case of at least one type of borrower, the incapacitated borrower.”). 
102 Mark A. Rothstein, Genetics and the Work Force of the Next Hundred Years, 2000 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 371, 392–93 (“[A]lbeit a government paternalism intended to compensate for the inequality in 
bargaining power between employers and employees.”). 
103 Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 764 (1983) 
(footnotes omitted).  
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issuer of the security has filed a registration statement 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.”104 
 In sum, scholars in contract and related areas of law often use a 
non-gendered definition of paternalism under which “a policy counts as 
paternalistic if it is justified on the belief that it will make a person better off 
than if the person had been left to choose between the available options for 
him or herself.”105 Such policies—restricting the choices of a “person” as 
likely to be a “him” as a “her”—are better described as parentalist unless 
the writer indicates an important relevance of gender, or otherwise shows 
the writer’s intent to convey a gendered meaning. In the absence of such 
manifested intent, writers should apply the strong and widely accepted 
reasons for ordinarily using gender-neutral language to avoid reducing 
women’s visibility or otherwise relegating women to secondary status. So, 
when a legal scholar wants to discuss limiting freedom of contract to protect 
contracting parties of all genders—such as consumers, borrowers, 
employees, or investors—the rationale for those limits is better described 
with the gender-neutral word parentalism.  
The strong and widely-accepted reasons for ordinarily using 
gender-neutral language apply as well to variants of “paternalism”—such as 
“libertarian paternalism”106 (which should be called “libertarian 
parentalism”) and “soft paternalism”107 (which should be called “soft 
parentalism”)—because these variants are generally defined without 
mention of any important relevance of gender that would suggest an intent 
to convey a gendered meaning, and thus justify gendered language. For 
instance, recent articles contain statements like:  
• “Under the philosophy of libertarian paternalism, a 
person in power seeks to create policies that steer 
people toward outcomes that should promote their 
welfare but also allow people ‘to go their own 
way’”;108  
• “[P]olicies that engage in soft paternalism—as 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein characterize it, . . . 
‘tr[y] to influence choices in a way that will make 
choosers better off,’ but still ensure that ‘people 
                                                                                                                     
104 Susanna Kim Ripken, Paternalism and Securities Regulation, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 11 
(2015). 
105 Jacob Goldin, Libertarian Quasi-Paternalism, 82 MO. L. REV. 669, 669 (2017). 
106 Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003), 
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12876718.   
107 Marvin Lim, Scrutinizing Sex Under Natural Law: Unitive Sex, Self-Gratifying Sex, and 
Concepts of Harm, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 579, 632 (2017).  
108 Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Nudges, 82 MO. L. REV. 695, 695 (2017) (footnote omitted). 
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should be free . . . to opt out of [specific] arrangements 
if they [choose] to do so’”;109 and 
• “[A] number of behavioral science professors and law 
professors advocate policies and regulations known as 
forms of soft paternalism. Examples of soft 
paternalism are defaulting people into 401(k) 
retirement plans and cooling-off periods before 
marriage or divorce and for home-solicitation sales. 
Types of soft paternalism include libertarian 
paternalism, which endeavors to preserve people’s 
freedom of choice, while intending to influence 
people’s choices to make them better off; asymmetric 
paternalism, which strives to produce large benefits to 
people who are prone to decision-making errors, while 
imposing little or even no costs on those who are not 
prone to decision-making errors; cautious 
paternalism, which requires that policymakers 
determine conditions under which policy benefits 
outweigh costs; and light paternalism, which attempts 
to enhance individual choice without restricting it.”110 
Such policies that “influence people’s choices,” when those people may 
be of any gender, are better described as parentalist unless the writer 
indicates an important relevance of gender, or otherwise shows the writer’s 
intent to convey a gendered meaning. In the absence of such manifested 
intent, writers should apply the strong and widely accepted reasons for 
ordinarily using gender-neutral language to avoid reducing women’s 
visibility or otherwise relegating women to secondary status. So instead of 
creating and discussing variants of “paternalism”—such as “libertarian 
paternalism” or “soft paternalism”—legal scholars should use the 
gender-neutral parentalism, as in “libertarian parentalism” or “soft 
parentalism.” 
C. Non-Gendered Uses of “Paternalism” 
The previous subsection quoted legal scholarship defining 
“paternalism,” and variants thereof, in non-gendered ways and cited those 
passages as examples of writing in which replacing paternalism with 
parentalism seems warranted by the widely accepted reasons for 
gender-neutral language to avoid reducing women’s visibility or otherwise 
relegating women to secondary status. This Section continues in that vein by 
                                                                                                                     
109 Lim, supra note 107, at 632 (third, fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations in original). 
110 Peter H. Huang, Achieving American Retirement Prosperity by Changing Americans’ Thinking 
About Retirement, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 189, 228 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
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quoting other legal scholarship using paternalism without suggesting any 
important relevance to gender and thus no apparent intent to convey a 
gendered meaning. Thus, in each of the following quotes replacing 
paternalism with parentalism seems warranted by the widely accepted 
reasons for gender-neutral language.  
1. “Paternalism” Contrasted with Autonomy or Liberty 
Several legal scholars use the word paternalism as an opposite of 
autonomy or liberty: 
• [A] “prominent theory of rights . . . imposing limits on 
the state . . . claim[s] that a person’s autonomy is 
violated if he is treated on the basis of certain 
impermissible—that is, moralistic or paternalistic—
considerations”;111 
• “Paternalism is widespread throughout our legal 
system and is undeniably a restriction on freedom. 
Our society has decided that in certain situations, the 
government oversight is worth the restriction. For 
example, society has rightly decided that paternalistic 
decisions regarding seat belt laws, or laws that bar 
riding a motorcycle without a helmet, are worth the 
restriction on our freedoms”;112   
• “There is undoubtedly a libertarian flavor to 
autonomy theories of contract, and certainly such 
theories provide ample resources to criticize 
paternalist impulses in contract law. Judges and 
legislators ought not to substitute their vision of the 
good for that of the parties to a contract”;113 
• “Libertarians will generally prefer cash transfer 
schemes rather than in-kind programs on the grounds 
that cash transfers promote recipients’ autonomy and 
self-ownership, whereas in-kind transfers exemplify 
the type of paternalism that libertarianism abhors”;114 
and 
                                                                                                                     
111 Kapsaski Ifigeneia, Dignity, Rights, and the Role of Consent in German Criminal Law, 54 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 401, 417 (2017). 
112 Gregg M. Jacobson, Unnecessary Paternalism: Why Bad Faith Limitations on Liability Should 
Be Enforced Between Sophisticated Entities, 12 J. AM. C. CONSTRUCTION LAW. 103, 105 (2018). 
113 Nathan B. Oman, Reconsidering Contractual Consent: Why We Shouldn’t Worry Too Much 
About Boilerplate and Other Puzzles, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 215, 222 (2017). 
114 Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income, 
2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1234. 
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• “If paternalism involves the substitution of one’s 
judgment with another agent’s, egalitarians may need 
to acknowledge the role of paternalism in support of a 
large public sector.”115 
As the autonomy or liberty of a person of any gender may be at issue, 
legal scholarship should describe the opposite of autonomy or liberty as 
parentalism rather than paternalism, unless the writer indicates some 
important relevance of gender to justify gendered language. 
2. “Paternalism” Contrasted with the Autonomy to Control One’s 
Own Body 
Other articles in legal journals contrast “paternalism” with the autonomy 
or liberty to control one’s own body: 
• “Standard examples of . . . paternalist legislation 
[include] bans on the sale of body parts”;116 
• “Criminal paternalism, for example, would allow 
persons to be punished when their acts cause 
significant harms to the very persons who commit 
them”;117 
• “[I]ndividual acts of autonomy impact[ing] on 
individual well-being (e.g. acts of self-harm)” “is the 
quintessential clash animating debates between 
liberals/libertarians and paternalists”;118 
• “[P]ublic health initiatives that require behavioral 
changes [such as addressing tobacco use, insufficient 
physical activity, and poor diet] are vulnerable to 
criticism that they smack of paternalism or interfere 
with individual liberty”;119 and 
• “[T]he relationship between paternalism and liberty is 
a zero-sum game: every paternalistic move to protect 
persons who are drunk from decisions they may later 
                                                                                                                     
115 Eric Beerbohm, Must Rawlsians Be Hamiltonians? Small Government and Political Illiberalism, 
62 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 27 (2017). 
116 Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro, A Pluralist Case for the Harm Principle, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 361, 
361 (2017). 
117 Douglas Husak, What’s Legal About Legal Moralism?, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 381, 398 (2017). 
118 John Danaher, Robotic Rape and Robotic Child Sexual Abuse: Should They Be Criminalised?, 
11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 71, 78 (2017). 
119 Jessica Mantel, Tackling the Social Determinants of Health: A Central Role for Providers, 33 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 234 (2017). 
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regret does so at the cost of limiting the liberty of 
persons to decide such matters for themselves.”120 
As the body at issue in these examples may belong to a person of any 
gender, legal scholarship should describe policies restricting that person’s 
autonomy to control that body as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless 
the writer indicates some important relevance of gender to justify gendered 
language. 
3. Consumers of Soda, Alcohol, or the Like as Objects of 
“Paternalism” 
Further, several law journal articles describe consumers of potentially 
harmful products (like soda, alcohol, or marijuana) as objects of 
“paternalism”: 
• “One academic saw [a court decision overturning 
New York City’s prohibition on restaurants serving 
certain sugary drinks in large sizes] as a rejection of 
an unappealing variety of paternalism, and in some 
circles Mayor Bloomberg [who proposed the soda 
regulation] was dubbed ‘Nanny Bloomberg’”;121 
• “When government is perceived as taking away 
choice in an area of daily living as basic and 
fundamental as food and drink, Americans sometimes 
view such efforts with skepticism, especially if the 
reasons for the proposed limitations are viewed as 
paternalistic. When a state or local government 
proposes to tax soda, paternalism concerns are often 
compounded by suspicion that citizens who are more 
vulnerable will be asked to shoulder an unfair tax 
burden”;122 and refer to 
• “Paternalistic nudges (nudges that seek to influence 
people’s choices in their own interests, such as those 
aimed at discouraging smoking).”123 
As the consumer at issue may be of any gender, legal scholarship should 
describe laws or policies discouraging consumption of soda, alcohol, or 
                                                                                                                     
120 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Peter Westen, How to Think (Like a Lawyer) About Rape, 11 CRIM. 
L. & PHIL. 759, 787 (2017). 
121 David Ray Papke & Mary Elise Papke, A Foe More Than a Friend: Law and the Health of the 
American Urban Poor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 21 (2017) (footnote omitted). 
122 David A. Dana & Janice Nadler, Soda Taxes as a Legal and Social Movement, 13 NW. J. L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 84, 106 (2018) (footnote omitted). 
123 Kiran Iyer, Nudging Virtue, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 469, 472 (2017). 
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marijuana as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates 
some important relevance of gender to justify gendered language. 
4. Consumers of FDA-Regulated Products as Objects of 
“Paternalism” 
Similarly, several pieces of legal scholarship describe consumers of 
products (actually or possibly) regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) or other lawmakers as objects of “paternalism”: 
• “The 1962 Amendments [to the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act] ushered in a new era of paternalism in 
drug regulation: the requirement that a sponsor 
demonstrate a drug’s efficacy before consumers can 
access it removes the choice from patients and their 
physicians of whether to take a risk on a drug that 
might offer important benefits but has not been 
adequately proven to do so”;124 
• “[T]he FDA is making a paternalistic value 
judgment—that it is better to ensure zero negative 
reactions by limiting consumer access to [genetic 
testing] information across the board than to allow 
people to make their own choices about whether the 
tests are appropriate for them”;125 
• “Gradually, however, federal law shifted from a focus 
on empowering patients, to a more paternalistic 
approach—one that in practice is often preoccupied 
with erecting roadblocks. This reached fruition in the 
1962 Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments to the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which 
required manufacturers to ‘provide substantial 
evidence of effectiveness for the product’s intended 
use’”;126 
• “A fifth argument asserted for the right to promote 
off-label says that the FDA is acting paternalistically, 
aiming to protect patients from making poor 
                                                                                                                     
124 Kyle T. Edwards, The Role of Patient Participation in Drug Approvals: Lessons from the 
Accelerated Approval of Eteplirsen, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 406, 413 (2017). 
125 Shelby Baird, Note, Don’t Try This at Home: The FDA’s Restrictive Regulation of Home-Testing 
Devices, 67 DUKE L.J. 383, 424 (2017). 
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consumption decisions based on what they (or their 
physicians) hear in the promotions”;127 
• “The motivation for this paternalistic intervention [of 
a federal prohibition of drugs, such as the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, which raises prices of 
these drugs and reduces their availability] is simple: 
drugs can be bad for users and for their families”;128 
and 
• “Eliminating [the FDA’s ability to restrict some 
methods by which pharmaceutical firms promote their 
products] could push the FDA to look to other—
frequently more paternalistic—options, such as 
product gatekeeping or restrictions on product use, to 
achieve its public health mission.”129 
As consumers of most or all FDA-regulated products may be of any 
gender, legal scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting such 
consumers’ choices as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer 
indicates some important relevance of gender to justify gendered language. 
5. Consumer Debtors and Consumers Generally as Objects of 
“Paternalism” 
Additionally, several pieces in law journals describe consumers, or 
consumer debtors, as objects of “paternalism”: 
• “When it comes to consumer protection, paternalism 
is not a hot issue in Europe: very few authors feel the 
need to criticize or, as the case may be, justify 
paternalism. In consumer law particularly, 
paternalism goes back such a long way in the national 
traditions of some of the founding Member States that 
it is hardly questioned”;130 
• “‘[P]rivate paternalism,’ . . . [b]est articulated by Omri 
Ben-Shahar, . . . asserts that, regardless of the process 
                                                                                                                     
127 Christopher Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right to Promote Drugs Off-
Label, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1019, 1044 (2017). 
128 Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Dealing More Effectively and Humanely with Illegal 
Drugs, 46 CRIME & JUST. 95, 111 (2017), https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/688458. 
129 Patricia J. Zettler, The Indirect Consequences of Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1053, 1060 (2017). 
130 Geneviève Helleringer & Anne-Lise Sibony, European Consumer Protection Through the 
Behavioral Lens, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 607, 611 (2017). 
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by which boilerplate is created, its content is good for 
the majority of consumers”;131 
• “[J]udicial review of a reaffirmation agreement [by a 
debtor in bankruptcy] is largely a paternalistic 
endeavor wherein a bankruptcy court is obligated to 
independently consider and reject, if appropriate, an 
agreement between private parties”;132 
• “As a result [of the CARD Act], it is surely true that 
some consumers are paternalistically prevented from 
running up credit card debts that they can’t pay”;133 
and 
• “When he was in the House, [Rep. Randy Neugebauer 
(R-TX), who complained that Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau regulations restricted access to 
credit,] opposed actions to regulate payday loans, 
labeling the effort as ‘paternalistic erosion of 
consumer product choices.’”134 
As consumers, including consumer debtors, may be of any gender, legal 
scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting such consumers’ 
choices as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates 
some important relevance of gender to justify gendered language. 
6. Consumers of Speech or Information as Objects of “Paternalism” 
Likewise, several law journal articles describe recipients of speech or 
information as objects of “paternalism”: 
• “[M]any [Campbell law students] bridled at what they 
viewed as the [Campbell law] faculty’s paternalism . . 
. [such as] the required curriculum”;135 
•  “Rejecting the state’s ‘highly paternalistic’ regulatory 
approach, the Court argued instead for relying on the 
                                                                                                                     
131 James Gibson, Boilerplate’s False Dichotomy, 106 GEO. L.J. 249, 261 (2018). 
132 Ryan W. Johnson, 24 Variations of a Reaffirmation Agreement and the Corresponding Actions 
Required by the Court, 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 26 (2018). 
133 Jason Scott Johnston, The Freedom to Fail: Market Access as the Path to Overcoming Poverty 
and Inequality, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 43 (2017). 
134 Legislative Highlights, 36 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10 (2017); see also Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 5 (2016) 
(statement of Rep. Randy Neugebauer, Chairman of the H. Subcomm.). 
135 Richard A. Lord, In Memoriam: F. Leary Davis: Death of a Dream Salesman, 40 CAMPBELL L. 
REV. 13, 23 (2018). 
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free market as the mechanism that would ensure the 
best expressive environment for consumers”;136 
• “[W]hen a government chooses to suppress this free 
flow of information, [the government acts] in 
precisely the sort of paternalistic manner that the First 
Amendment forbids”;137 
• “[T]he Court has disfavored paternalistic attempts to 
protect consumers from the possibility of receiving 
misleading information and has favored allowing 
more commercial speech”;138 and 
• “[The Court has described the] ‘highly paternalistic 
approach’ of suppressing speech because of its effects 
on listeners.”139 
As recipients of speech or information may be of any gender, legal 
scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting those recipients’ 
sources of information as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the 
writer indicates some important relevance of gender to justify gendered 
language. 
7. Lawyers’ Clients as Objects of “Paternalism” 
Many law review articles also describe lawyers’ clients as objects of 
“paternalism”: 
• “Avoiding lawyer paternalism [toward clients] is 
arguably a guiding principle of the Model Rules. 
Toward that end, the Rules require full disclosure to a 
client to the maximum extent possible”;140 
• “[T]he blanket ban on nonlawyers’ legal advice that 
applies in most jurisdictions does not seem to be 
narrowly drawn . . . . Such paternalistic and 
                                                                                                                     
136 Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant 
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1427 (2017). 
137 Daniel D. Bracciano, Comment, Commercial Speech Doctrine and Virginia’s ‘Thirsty Thursday’ 
Ban, 27 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 207, 238 (2017). 
138 Lauren Myers, Note, A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Material-Connection Disclosures: 
Endorsers, Instagram, and the Federal Trade Commission’s Endorsement Guides, 66 DUKE L.J. 1371, 
1400 (2017). 
139 David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of Practical Obscurity, 
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1428 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375 (2002)).  
140 Elinor R. Jordan, Point, Click, Green Card: Can Technology Close the Gap in Immigrant Access 
to Justice?, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 287, 337 (2017) (footnote omitted).  
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prophylactic bans have seldom been accepted by the 
Supreme Court”;141 
• Scholars have raised “the question of whether lawyers 
are overly paternalistic to their clients”;142 
• “[A]ttorneys’ relationships with juveniles have 
transitioned from an initially more paternalistic model 
(i.e., best interests) to more of a legal advocacy role 
(i.e., expressed interest model)”;143 
• “The cocooning of lawyers from their ethical 
conscience may, in fact, also harm their clients in that 
lawyers with anesthetized moral consciences may 
impose solutions paternalistically on clients who 
would not have wanted their interest pursued at all 
costs had they been engaged in a ‘moral dialogue’”;144 
and 
• “[T]he tribal lawyer who excessively second-guesses 
the authority of an authorized agent risks 
paternalistically depriving the tribe of its autonomy as 
a political entity and as a client.”145 
As lawyers’ clients may be of any gender, legal scholarship should 
describe laws or policies restricting their information or choices as 
parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some 
important relevance of gender to justify gendered language. 
8. Medical Patients as Objects of “Paternalism” 
A number of law articles describe medical patients as objects of 
“paternalism”: 
• “The paternalism that characterized the past practice 
of medicine, where physicians were presumed to 
                                                                                                                     
141 Michele Cotton, Improving Access to Justice by Enforcing the Free Speech Clause, 83 BROOK. 
L. REV. 111, 149 (2017). 
142 David Luban & W. Bradley Wendel, Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History, 30 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 337, 342-43 (2017). 
143 Erika Fountain & Jennifer L. Woolard, The Capacity for Effective Relationships Among 
Attorneys, Juvenile Clients, and Parents, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 493, 499 (2017). 
144 JoNel Newman & Donald Nicolson, A Tale of Two Clinics: Similarities and Differences in 
Evidence of the “Clinic Effect” on the Development of Law Students’ Ethical and Altruistic Professional 
Identities, 35 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 8 (2017). 
145 Michael J. Lockman, An Ethical Representation of Sovereign Clients in Debt Disputes, 30 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 85 (2017). 
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know what is best for patients, has been replaced with 
respect for patient autonomy”;146 
• “Health care providers are shifting away from a 
paternalistic approach to patient care and moving 
towards a partnership approach”;147 
• “Whereas traditionally, physicians would 
paternalistically make decisions for their patients, 
patients now have a much greater role in medical 
decision making”;148 
• “Nursing homes have historically taken the position 
that their duty of care to residents requires that, in 
some quasi-paternalistic view, they err on the side of 
protecting the ‘vulnerable’ resident from harm”;149 
• “These approaches [patient-centered, or 
client-centered, care in helping professions such as 
doctors and social workers charged with treating their 
patients, and lawyers charged with representing their 
clients] actively involve the patient or client in 
information-gathering and decision-making (in 
contrast to more paternalistic and traditional 
approaches to patient care)”;150 and 
• “Even a well-intended physician may be more 
paternalistic when dealing with elderly and disabled 
patients.”151 
As medical patients may be of any gender, legal scholarship should 
describe laws or policies restricting their information or choices as 
parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some 
important relevance of gender to justify gendered language. 
                                                                                                                     
146 Jessica Mantel, Refusing to Treat Noncompliant Patients Is Bad Medicine, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 
127, 160-61 (2017). 
147 S. Allan Adelman, The Evolution of Patient Rights: Individual Benefits and Provider Burdens, 
10 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 66, 72 (2017). 
148 Hilary Young, A Proposal for Access to Treatment Contrary to Clinical Judgment, 11 MCGILL 
J.L. & HEALTH 1, 5 (2017). 
149 Roy G. Spece, Jr. et al., (Implicit) Consent to Intimacy, 50 IND. L. REV. 907, 919 (2017). 
150 Debra Chopp, Addressing Cultural Bias in the Legal Profession, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 364, 395 (2017). 
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9. Investors as Objects of “Paternalistic” Policies 
Some legal scholarship uses the word “paternalistic” to describe policies 
designed to protect investors: 
• “[M]erit regulation [of securities] is paternalistic, 
predicated on the notion that investors are unable to 
determine which investments further their interests 
and which do not”;152 
• “Where dissenter’s rights are imposed by statute there 
is a paternalistic protection afforded a potentially 
dissenting member to the disadvantage of the LLC and 
the remaining members”;153 and 
• “Human investors are locked out of direct investments 
in hedge funds themselves by a variety of 
paternalistic, if well-meaning, rules, which include 
requirements that investors must be able to change 
their allocation of investments in 401(k)s at least once 
every three months, and by the reality that almost all 
hedge funds offer only unregistered securities and are 
thus prohibited from securing investments from 
anyone who is not a so-called ‘accredited investor’ 
under Regulation D.”154 
As investors may be of any gender, legal scholarship should describe 
laws or policies restricting their information or choices as parentalist rather 
than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some important relevance of 
gender to justify gendered language. 
10. Employees as Objects of “Paternalistic” Policies 
Some articles in law journals describe employees as objects of 
“paternalistic” policies: 
• “Traditionally, employers had a more paternalistic 
role of defining and funding the benefits that 
employees most needed.”155 
                                                                                                                     
152 Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory Damage, 92 TUL. 
L. REV. 339, 378 (2017). 
153 Thomas E. Rutledge & Katharine M. Sagan, An Amendment Too Far?: Limits on the Ability of 
Less Than All Members to Amend the Operating Agreement, 16 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 1, 34 (2017). 
154 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge 
Fund Activism and Our Stranger Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1934-35 (2016) 
(footnote omitted). 
155 Lauren R. Roth, Redefining “Medical Care”, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 70 (2017). 
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• “Railroads commonly adopted paternalistic policies 
toward their employees.”156 
As employees may be of any gender, legal scholarship should describe 
laws or policies restricting their information or choices as parentalist rather 
than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some important relevance of 
gender to justify gendered language. 
11. Entire Peoples as Objects of “Paternalism” 
Several pieces of legal scholarship describe entire peoples as objects of 
“paternalism”: 
• “The federal government’s ‘paternalistic federal 
management policies’ and ‘failure to acknowledge the 
tribes’ sovereign powers’ has allowed others to 
exploit tribal reservations”;157 
• “There is at least a healthy dose of skepticism, 
however, among some about using the trust 
responsibility [in which the federal government acts 
as ‘trustee’ over Indian trust lands] to perpetuate what 
is seen as a paternalistic federal trust structure, and an 
associated implication of Indian incompetence, rather 
than using the federal trust relationship as a true 
platform for indigenous self-governance and 
self-determination”;158 
• “The [Hawaiian Home Commission] Act is inherently 
flawed because it is rooted in racism and shot through 
with paternalism. . . . Paternalism is reflected in the 
Act because native Hawaiians become wards of the 
government by having to pay rent for the lands, 
instead of being given lands fee simple”;159 and 
• “[W]e tend to paternalistically discard suggestions 
that most Palestinians might agree with their elected 
government which we deem extremist (Hamas), and 
                                                                                                                     
156 Robert J. Kaczorowski, From Petitions for Gratuities to Claims for Damages: Personal Injuries 
and Railroads During the Industrialization of the United States, 57 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 261, 285 (2017). 
157 Jin Hyung Lee, Establishing Applicable Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters on Indian 
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so we choose to ignore any Palestinian discourse 
disconfirming our wishful perceptions.”160 
As entire peoples may include individuals of any gender, legal 
scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting or devaluing their 
choices as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates 
some important relevance of gender to justify gendered language. 
12. Children as Objects of “Paternalism” 
Several law review articles describe children as the objects of 
“paternalism”: 
• “[J]uvenile defenders face . . . the challenge of 
paternalism, which threatens to deprive children of 
meaningful choice and voice in the delinquency 
system”;161 
• “The ‘no excuses’ model sets up charter schools 
designed to actively address the attributes thought to 
hold back low income students through a hands-on, 
paternalistic model of behavioral modification and 
direction”;162 
• “The infancy doctrine is a middle ground between 
complete freedom of contract for youth and a 
paternalistic prohibition on their entering into binding 
agreements”;163 and 
• The Convention on the Rights of the Child “pivoted 
local and international charitable organizations away 
from paternalistic approaches to child protection and 
toward the placement of children at the heart of their 
own human rights recognition.”164 
As children may be of any gender, legal scholarship should describe 
laws or policies restricting their information or choices as parentalist rather 
than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some important relevance of 
gender to justify gendered language. 
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693 (2017). 
163 Kevin Lapp, Taking Back Juvenile Confessions, 64 UCLA L. REV. 902, 940 (2017). 
164 Janet E. Lord, Child Rights Trending: Accommodating Children with Disabilities in the Global 
Human Rights Framework and US Foreign Policy, 16 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 1, 3 (2017). 
 
 
2020] PATERNALISM OR GENDER-NEUTRALITY? 579 
13. Disabled Persons as Objects of “Paternalism” 
Many pieces of legal scholarship describe disabled persons as objects of 
“paternalism”: 
• “Article 12 challenges long-standing paternalistic 
laws and policies that had deprived people with 
disabilities throughout the world of their right to make 
and exercise decisions that people who are not labeled 
as disabled are free to make every day”;165 
• “Despite their intensive paternalism and strict rules, 
home officials [overseeing institutions for disabled 
veterans] emphasized the home aspect of the 
institutions in an attempt to differentiate them from 
other charitable institutions”;166 
• “The independent living model is part of the larger 
disability rights movement and social model of 
disability, which ‘developed as a reaction to the 
perceived paternalism and oppression that attended a 
welfare-based response to disability’”;167 
• “[T]his assumption invites the return of a paternalistic 
view of disabled persons—an attitude which the 
disability community has worked long and hard to 
eradicate: [It] threatens to set back decades of 
legislative action and social advocacy devoted to the 
goal of empowering the disabled to take control over 
every aspect of their lives”;168 and 
• “Disability is viewed socially as a personal trag-edy 
[sic] or misfortune that requires charitable giving, 
pity, and paternalism from society.”169 
As disabled persons may be of any gender, legal scholarship should 
describe laws or policies restricting their choices as parentalist rather than 
                                                                                                                     
165 Arlene S. Kanter & Yotam Tolub, The Fight for Personhood, Legal Capacity, and Equal 
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575 (2017). 
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paternalist, unless the writer indicates some important relevance of gender 
to justify gendered language. 
14. Miscellaneous Objects of “Paternalism” 
Legal scholarship includes a variety of other people, who could be of 
any gender, described as objects of “paternalism.” Numerous examples 
include:  
• “Poverty regulation actively pressed poor people into 
the worst jobs . . . . Such [regulation] is . . . 
paternalistic in its use of authority to manage and 
monitor poor people’s behaviors”;170 
•  “Congress paternalistically justified BACT [the Best 
Available Control Technology mandated by the EPA 
and authorized by the Clean Air Act] by claiming that 
by imposing BACT, states would have more room for 
economic growth under the increment because all 
sources would be required to install state-of-the-art 
controls”;171 
• “Some modern scholars believe that African 
Americans actually became worse off after the Civil 
War as ‘they lost the paternalistic slave health care 
system and very little was available to replace it’”;172 
• “Negating [an individual’s actual expressed] consent 
[to sexual acts because that individual was 
intoxicated] may not only result in criminalizing 
innocuous behaviors, when an actor relies on a 
partner’s express assent to sex, but it is also notably 
paternalistic, raising concerns that the law 
impermissibly interferes with this partner’s sexual 
behavior in circumstances where the partner might be 
making less than prudent decisions that [the partner] 
would not have made had the partner’s judgment not 
been clouded by intoxication”;173 
                                                                                                                     
170 Nantiya Ruan, Corporate Masters & Low-Wage Servants: The Social Control of Workers in 
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• “[A]lthough court officials and police officers assert 
that they direct low-income families into the juvenile 
justice system out of a desire to provide ‘help,’ this 
paternalistic attitude ultimately allows the state to 
attain social control over a wider swath of the 
poor”;174 
• “[A] strong paternalism argument . . . can arise when 
there is a reason to believe people will fail to 
adequately look out for their own interests, such as 
laws restricting gambling out of concern for the social 
costs of gambling addictions and the impact on 
disadvantaged or vulnerable populations; critics of 
marijuana legalization have raised similar 
arguments”;175 
• “One who has violated the law deserves to lose the 
protection against paternalistic interference that other 
adult citizens enjoy as a matter of right”;176 
• “The family [in need of ongoing social services] may 
truly require assistance but refuse to succumb to the 
paternalistic notion of state oversight”;177 
• “[N]udge theory . . . strikes a delicate balance between 
private and public regulation by paternalistically 
nudging people through a choice-architecture that 
does not eliminate or reduce freedom of choice”;178 
• Prosecuting jaywalkers “can be justified by the idea of 
paternalism—the idea that people should be protected 
from their own foolishness and that the State knows 
better than the individual”;179 
• “For supporters, basic income does several things: it 
eliminates poverty; counters rising income inequality; 
[and] non-paternalistically promotes freedom because 
                                                                                                                     
174 Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 
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recipients are free to use their basic income in 
whatever way they deem appropriate, in contrast to 
traditional means-tested and in-kind welfare state 
policies”;180 and 
• “[A] truly paternalistic copyright regime would 
provide meaningful protections for authors against 
one-sided copyright transfers and would rely on more 
tailored and direct incentives for artistic creation.”181 
As the relevant people in any of these examples may be of any gender, 
legal scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting their choices as 
parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some 
important relevance of gender to justify gendered language. 
D. Arguments for Using Paternalism to Describe Laws Restricting People 
of All Genders 
1. Overview 
The previous two subsections quoted legal scholarship defining and 
using the word “paternalism” without suggesting any important relevance to 
gender and thus no apparent intent to convey a gendered meaning. These 
quotes refer to laws or policies aiming to protect people by restricting their 
choices. As the objects of these laws and policies may be of any gender, 
replacing paternalism with parentalism in each of these quotes is 
presumptively warranted by the general presumption for gender-neutral 
language (summarized in Section I) to avoid reducing women’s visibility or 
otherwise relegating women to secondary status. This argument for the 
gender-neutral word parentalism may prompt several counterarguments, 
including: (A) all laws are gendered male; (B) restricting people’s choices 
(even to protect those people) is gendered male; and (C) paternalism’s 
negative connotations attach to men. 
2. Law as Gendered Male 
If one believes that all our laws are gendered male then one might well 
believe laws or policies aiming to protect people by restricting their choices 
are gendered male, even if persons of any gender may be the objects of these 
laws or policies. The belief that all our laws are gendered male might follow 
from the fairly common feminist view that “law perpetuates patriarchy and 
                                                                                                                     
180 Matthew Dimick, Better Than Basic Income? Liberty, Equality, and the Regulation of Working 
Time, 50 IND. L. REV. 473, 476 (2017). 
181 Kevin J. Hickey, Copyright Paternalism, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 415, 416 (2017). 
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has done so for centuries, across the globe, and in all aspects of life.”182 For 
instance, Deborah Threedy writes: 
American law has, until very recently, been constructed almost 
exclusively by the male gender. Therefore, it should not be 
surprising that ‘law’ incorporates and reflects male gender 
traits. Some of these traits are identified as the preference for 
rationality over other ways of knowing (e.g., intuition); for 
objectivity over subjectivity; for abstraction over 
contextualization; and for hierarchical decision-making over 
consensus or compromise. Contract law, like law more 
generally, is said to be male-gendered because of the perceived 
presence of these traits. In other words, contract law is not 
neutral; it is one of the many social structures that supports a 
male preference.183 
Arguments along these lines might plausibly justify using gendered 
language to discuss any law—including using the gendered word 
paternalism to describe laws aiming to protect people of all genders by 
restricting their choices—because a writer making such an argument would 
be manifesting an intent to convey a gendered meaning: all our laws are 
gendered male. In other words, a writer who says all our laws are gendered 
male thereby justifies that writer’s use of the gendered word paternalism 
much as a writer is justified in using that gendered word to refer to the 
institutionalization of male dominance or an attitude especially 
characteristic of men.184 
3. Protecting Others by Restricting Their Choices as Gendered Male 
Even a writer who does not argue that all our laws are gendered male 
might argue that laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting 
their choices are gendered male. That is, one might argue that protecting-by 
-restricting-choice is gendered male, so laws doing this are gendered male.  
The propensity to believe that protecting-by-restricting-choice is 
gendered male may depend on which analogy one makes. One view is that 
laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their choices are 
analogous to situations, discussed in Section II, in which men purportedly 
aim (by law or otherwise) to protect women by restricting women’s 
                                                                                                                     
182  Robin West, Women in the Legal Academy: A Brief History of Feminist Legal Theory, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 998 (2018) (describing the “critical claim” of “[f]eminist legal theory from the 
1980s and 1990s”). See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
163 (1989) (“The state is male jurisprudentially, meaning that it adopts the standpoint of male power on 
the relation between law and society.”). 
183 Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1999) 
(footnotes omitted). 
184 See supra Sections II.A–B. 
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choices.185 Under this view, one might plausibly see 
protecting-by-restricting-choice laws (aiming to protect people of all 
genders) as gendered male. In this view’s analogy, the people protected and 
restricted by such laws are analogous to women and the lawmakers are 
analogous to men.  
In contrast, the alternative view analogizes 
protecting-by-restricting-choice laws to parenting, so the people protected 
and restricted by such laws are analogous to children, while the lawmakers 
are analogous to parents and other caretakers of children. This seems the 
better analogy for the same reasons our society and legal profession have 
largely moved to gender-neutral language: protecting (only) women by 
restricting (only) women’s choices reduces women’s visibility, “relegates 
girls and women to ‘secondary status,’” and thus “not only reflects but also 
helps to construct and perpetuate a sexist reality.”186 In contrast, protecting 
children (of all genders) by restricting children’s choices raises no such 
concerns, and laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting 
their choices raise no such concerns. Sexism is not central to concerns about 
either laws aiming to protect people of all genders by restricting their 
choices, or to concerns about protecting children (of all genders187) by 
restricting their choices. In this important respect, laws aiming to protect 
people of all genders by restricting their choices are more analogous to 
parents aiming to protect children (of all genders) by restricting their choices 
than to men purportedly aiming to protect women by restricting women’s 
choices.  
Furthermore, while many doubt that men purporting to protect women 
by restricting women’s choices are sincerely trying to protect women, as 
opposed to privilege men,188 even libertarians (like me) opposed to many 
laws restricting people’s choices ostensibly for their own good can concede 
that many supporters of such laws are sincerely trying to protect vulnerable 
people, much as many parents restricting their children’s choices are 
sincerely trying to protect their children—such as by restraining an 
impulsive toddler about to run into the street without checking for oncoming 
cars. So, laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their 
choices should be analogized, not to protecting women by restricting 
women’s choices, but to parents protecting children (of all genders) by 
restricting children’s choices. 
And if one analogizes laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by 
restricting their choices to parents protecting children (of all genders) by 
                                                                                                                     
185See supra Section II.A. 
186 Fischer, supra note 29, at 222 (citations omitted). 
187 In contrast, sexism may be very relevant to parents treating their sons and daughters differently 
with respect to protecting them by restricting their choices.  
188 See infra note 207. 
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restricting children’s choices, then characterizing such laws as gendered 
collides with the fact that parents of all genders protect their children by 
restricting their children’s choices.189 In other words, analogizing 
protect-by-restricting-choice laws to parenting strengthens the case for 
describing such laws as (gender-neutral) parentalism rather than 
paternalism. In Rob Atkinson’s words, 
I say “parentalism” rather than “paternalism” in part to avoid 
the latter term’s connotations of officious intermeddling, but 
primarily to use a gender-neutral synonym. At least in my own 
experience, concern for another’s welfare combined with a 
claim of superior insight into the other’s needs can come from 
a parent of either sex.190 
However, while modern life confirms that “concern for another’s 
welfare combined with a claim of superior insight into the other’s needs can 
come from a parent of” any gender, that parental “concern for another’s 
welfare” is not always expressed by parental restrictions on their children’s 
choices.191 For instance, Peter Huang reports: 
I was once asked upon the start of a talk with discussion of 
some ideas related to paternalism, why the word “maternal” 
typically evokes positive connotations and emotions, but the 
word “paternal” usually evokes negative connotations and 
emotions. A member of that audience suggested that one 
reason is that mothers frame their interventions (e.g., “let me 
help you do that”) differently than fathers do (e.g., “do this and 
don’t do that”). Another member of the audience volunteered 
that dads and moms generally engage in different substantive 
types of parental interventions, perhaps due to a traditional 
sexual division of labor or outdated gender stereotypes.192 
These audience members may be suggesting that fathers, more than 
mothers, protect their children by restricting their children’s choices. And 
perhaps empirical studies would show that “protect-by-restricting-choice” 
parenting is gendered, that is, significantly more common among fathers 
than mothers.193 Such data might plausibly justify using the gendered word 
                                                                                                                     
189 See infra Section IV.A.6. 
190 Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 523 n.73 (1990). 
191 Id. 
192 Peter H. Huang, Authentic Happiness, Self-Knowledge and Legal Policy, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 755, 779 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
193 “Research on parenting during adolescence has shown that fathers tend to be less warm and 
more restrictive than mothers.” Matthew F. Bumpus et al., Parental Autonomy Granting During 
Adolescence: Exploring Gender Differences in Context, 37 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 163, 166 (2001) 
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paternalism to describe laws or policies aiming to protect people (of all 
genders) by restricting their choices because such data would support 
analogizing such laws specifically to fathering, rather than generally to 
parenting. 
On the other hand, perhaps empirical studies would show that 
“protect-by-restricting-choice” parenting is actually gendered female, that 
is, significantly more common among mothers than fathers. “Perhaps fathers 
seek to make their children strong and independent while mothers seek to 
keep them close to home and safe.”194 That conjecture by Joseph William 
Singer would suggest that laws treating parties as “strong and independent” 
are more paternal, while laws aiming to protect parties (or keep them “safe”) 
are more maternal.  
This suggestion perhaps finds support in Deborah Threedy’s 
observation of “‘freedom of contract’ being associated with the male gender 
                                                                                                                     
More recent scholarly literature assessing children’s autonomy often refers to parental 
“monitoring” of children, which may often be different from restricting them. See, e.g., Ann C. Crouter 
et al., Conditions Underlying Parents’ Knowledge About Children’s Daily Lives in Middle Childhood: 
Between- and Within-Family Comparisons, 70 CHILD DEV. 246, 246 (1999) (“Mothers’ knowledge did 
not vary as a function of how much they worked outside the home, but fathers knew more about their 
children’s activities, whereabouts, and companions when their wives worked longer hours. . . . Both 
mothers and fathers knew more about offspring of the same sex than about opposite-sex children . . . . 
Perhaps because parental involvement and monitoring are more ‘scripted’ for mothers than fathers, 
fathers’ knowledge was more consistently related to their children’s characteristics than was mothers.”); 
Nancy Darling & Lauree Tilton-Weaver, All in the Family: Within-Family Differences in Parental 
Monitoring and Adolescent Information Management, 55 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 390, 391 (2019) 
(“In one of the few studies of monitoring that sampled two children per family, Crouter, Helms-Erikson, 
Updegraff, and McHale [1999] measured parents’ knowledge of children’s routine activities by 
comparing parent and child reports across 7 days. The correlation between parents’ knowledge of their 
two children’s activities was relatively high [r = .41 for mothers and .65 for fathers].”); id. at 399 (“We 
were also unable to differentiate maternal from paternal behaviors.”). Studies have compared 
protect-by-restricting parenting in different societies, see supra note 9 (quoting Darling), and within our 
society of parents with different levels of education, Laura Wray-Lake et al., Developmental Patterns in 
Decision-Making Autonomy Across Middle Childhood and Adolescence: European American Parents’ 
Perspectives, 81 CHILD DEV. 636, 648 (2010) (“Our finding of a positive association between parents’ 
education and youth decision-making autonomy is consistent with some prior work and with the link 
between social class and autonomy found in the broader parenting literature. Our findings did not support 
[the] perspective that parents of lower social status offer more autonomy to encourage ‘natural growth’ 
in their children. Instead, our findings suggest that parents with less formal education may emphasize 
parental authority, perhaps to create a safer environment, whereas more educated parents emphasize 
self-direction.” (citations omitted)). 
Studies address gender in comparing protect-by-restricting of boys compared to such parenting of 
girls. See, e.g., id. (“Our results converged with those of several prior studies in documenting that girls 
have more autonomy in decisions than do boys. Girls may have greater decision-making autonomy as a 
function of their relative maturity. Our results are inconsistent with studies that found no gender 
differences or differences favoring boys.” (citations omitted)). 
However, research revealed no additional studies (beyond that cited in the first paragraph of this 
footnote) focused on differences (or lack of differences) between mothers and fathers with respect to 
protect-by-restricting parenting.   
194 Joseph William Singer, Anti Anti-Paternalism, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 277, 282 (2016).  
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and ‘paternalism’ with the female gender.”195 Freedom of contract has long 
received much of its support from conservatives and libertarians,196 centered 
on the Republican Party, which receives most of its votes from men.197 
Legally protecting vulnerable parties from harsh contract terms tends to be 
emphasized more by progressives and liberals,198 centered on the 
Democratic Party, which receives more of its votes from women.199 This 
                                                                                                                     
195 Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1261 (1999). Threedy 
“admit[s] to some disquiet with gendering ‘freedom of contract’ and ‘paternalism’ in this way.” Id. at 
1261 n.79. 
196 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1447, 1454 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)) (“Since the late nineteenth century, American political conservatism 
has generally been individualist in economic matters; it has . . . viewed freedom of contract as a 
fundamentally important value and resisted attempts to regulate it.”); Jean Braucher, Deception, 
Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in 
the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 833 (2006) (“[T]he conservative side in the legal 
culture war believes customers should insist on warranties to protect themselves against deceptive 
practices, and if they don’t, caveat emptor . . . .”); Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: 
Some Realism About the New Formalism (with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 13, 50 (2001) (“[R]ealist/progressive principles such as bad faith and unconscionability 
crystallized into consumer protection legislation and agency regulation . . . .”); Robert J. Dignam, There 
Is More to Fear Than Fear Itself: The National Labor Relations Board’s Attack on Purposeful and 
Necessary Workplace Conduct Rules Must Be Stopped, 52 VAL. U. L. REV. 395, 398 n.13 (2018) (“The 
NLRA was opposed by Republicans and big business, and was challenged as an interference with the 
‘freedom of contract’ between employers and employees . . . .”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Justice Scalia and 
Class Actions: A Loving Critique, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1977, 1990 (2017) (“It is certainly true that 
conservatives and libertarians believe in the freedom of contract . . . .”); Robert Hockett, Whose 
Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 22 (2005) (“Lochner infamously favored 
libertarian-liberal freedom of contract over egalitarian-liberal equalizing of de facto bargaining power 
and consequent opportunity.”); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private 
Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 173 (2000) (“[C]ontract 
doctrine was the site . . . of a[] . . . mildly ideologized debate between conservatives touting freedom of 
contract, on one side, and liberals advocating policing bargains in the interests of weak parties, on the 
other.”); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 738 (2011) 
(“[T]here is some evidence to suggest that the decision by an elected attorney general to take action in 
the consumer-protection field is influenced by citizen ideology: Attorneys general from ‘liberal’ states 
do more, while those from ‘conservative’ states do less.”); Matthew Lister, Citizenship, in the 
Immigration Context, 70 MD. L. REV. 175, 231–32 (2010) (“If there were no limits on what could be 
bargained for, this would be a serious problem. Such a system would be a libertarian system (rather than 
liberal) that gives unrestricted freedom of contract a place of pride. Liberal theories rightly reject such 
unrestricted freedom of contract.” (footnotes omitted)); Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns 
in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the 
Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 198 (2010) 
(referring to “the basic progressive tradition of consumer protection”). 
197 Richa Chaturvedi, A Closer Look at the Gender Gap in Presidential Voting, PEW RES. CTR. (July 
28, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/28/a-closer-look-at-the-gender-gap-in-
presidential-voting/. 
198 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 196, at 1991–93 (noting that liberals, more so than conservatives, 
believe that the government should intervene to regulate the market in efforts to ensure fairness). 
199 Chaturvedi, supra note 197. 
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“gender gap” in voting has continued since 1980,200 during which time 
“Americans have come to view the [two major political] parties increasingly 
in gendered terms of masculinity and femininity.”201 
Against this background of “[m]asculine Republicans and [f]eminine 
Democrats,”202 Deborah Threedy “acknowledg[ing] the irony of labeling 
‘paternalism’ as female gendered”203 might highlight how her plausible 
reasoning overcomes a misleading label. That is, paternalist may be a 
misleadingly inapt label for the protect-by-restricting-choice laws Threedy 
plausibly identifies as gendered female. Perhaps maternalism better 
describes the justifications for restrictions on contractual freedom—such as 
the unconscionability doctrine, usury laws, the minimum wage, and 
countless regulations limiting the range of enforceable promises by 
consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and others—more supported 
by “feminine Democrats” than “masculine Republicans.”  
In sum, empirical and conceptual doubt cautions against confidently 
concluding that protect-by-restricting-choice parenting is gendered. As 
noted above, empirical studies might show whether 
“protect-by-restricting-choice” parenting is gendered, that is, whether it is 
significantly more common among parents of any particular gender. 
However, any such data would reflect the social and historical context in 
which it was gathered.204 Consequently, reasonable people might disagree 
                                                                                                                     
200 Id. 
201 Nicholas J. G. Winter, Masculine Republicans and Feminine Democrats: Gender and 
Americans’ Explicit and Implicit Images of the Political Parties, 32 POL. BEHAV. 587, 587 (2010), 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9131-z.   
During the past three decades Americans have come to view the parties increasingly 
in gendered terms of masculinity and femininity. Utilizing three decades of American 
National Election Studies data and the results of a cognitive reaction-time experiment, 
this paper demonstrates empirically that these connections between party images and 
gender stereotypes have been forged at the explicit level of the traits that Americans 
associate with each party, and also at the implicit level of unconscious cognitive 
connections between gender and party stereotypes. 
Id.  
202 Id. 
203 Threedy, supra note 195, at 1261 n.79. 
204 Huang, supra note 192, at 778–80 (“Surely, differing perceptions about what being maternalistic 
versus being paternalistic mean reflect cultural and social conventions about gender roles.”); Cathy J. 
Jones, College Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to Play, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 113, 198 
n.414 (1992) (quoting Cathy J. Jones, Sexist Language: An Overview for Teachers and Librarians, 82 
LAW LIBR. J. 673, 679 n.18 (1990) (“A word that I now use consistently is parentalistic in place of 
paternalistic. . . . While, historically, paternalism may not have been inaccurate, given that most 
perceived authority figures in either the public or private realm were (white) men, the meaning to be 
conveyed has also always connoted the relationship between a parent-figure and a child-figure. 
Therefore, parentalism is both accurate (in terms of the meaning I wish to convey) and gender-neutral.”)); 
Singer, supra note 194, at 282 (“The concepts of paternalism and maternalism get their meaning from 
the social and historical context in which fathering and mothering occur. The family has changed over 
time as have the relations between parents and children.”).  
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on how much data across time and place would be sufficient to show that 
“protect-by-restricting-choice” parenting is sufficiently gendered to justify 
gendered language when analogizing protect-by-restricting-choice laws to 
parenting. Our usual presumption for gender-neutral language counsels for 
using the gender-neutral parentalist to describe such laws and policies 
aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their choices in the 
absence of sufficient data showing that the analogous parenting behavior is 
sufficiently gendered to justify gendered language (“paternalism” or 
“maternalism”) to describe such laws. 
4. Paternalism’s Negative Connotations Exclude It from Case for 
Gender-Neutral Language 
Even one who does not believe all our laws are gendered male, or that 
protecting-by-restricting-choice is gendered male, might believe that 
describing laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their 
choices with the gendered word paternalism is consistent with the reasons 
driving our society’s move toward gender-neutral language because 
paternalism’s connotations are negative.205 In other words, one might 
believe that, while gendered words attaching positive connotations to men 
(such as chairman or fireman) tend to relegate women to secondary status, 
because paternalism attaches negative connotations to men it does not 
relegate women to secondary status.  
However, the strong and widely accepted arguments for ordinarily using 
gender-neutral language are not only that gendered language relegates 
women to secondary status, but also that gendered language reduces 
women’s visibility. “For example, feminist scholars have long decried that 
masculine generics are androcentric, and make women seem invisible . . . 
.”206 Language reducing women’s visibility thereby relegates women to 
secondary status, not only with respect to positive associations (such as 
chairman or fireman) but with respect to any associations of being capable 
adults, including negative associations. 
It is perhaps entirely appropriate for men to bear the burdens of negative 
connotations associated with the plainly gendered paternalism (discussed in 
Section II) of male dominance or an attitude especially characteristic of men 
                                                                                                                     
205 Negative connotations of the word paternalism stretch from at least as far back as Locke and 
Kant to a contemporary law student editor’s observation that “[p]aternalism is often used because it stems 
from male dominance and how men treat people, and thus carries a negative connotation.” See supra 
note 7; see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Peter H. Huang, Positive Parentalism, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 26, 
2009), https://www.law.com//nationallawjournal/almID/1202427700551/?id=1202427700551 
(“Paternalism is a dirty word. The ‘nanny state,’ ‘Big Brother’ and similar terms invoke the dire specter 
of government intruding on individuals’ thoughts, behavior and choices.”). 
206 Prewitt-Freilino et al., supra note 30, at 270. 
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or directed primarily toward women.207 But if any negative connotations 
encumber parentalism—the gender-neutral description of laws aiming to 
protect people (of all genders) by restricting their choices—then using that 
gender-neutral word appropriately spreads the burden of those negative 
connotations on women who enact or support those laws, as well as on men 
who enact or support those laws.  
Moreover, negative connotations associated with 
protect-by-restricting-choice laws may be reduced by shifting our 
descriptions of them from paternalist to parentalist. Peter Huang contrasts 
the negative connotations of paternalism with the positive connotations of 
maternalism and the relatively neutral connotations of parentalism: 
Interestingly, an on-line dictionary and thesaurus defines 
maternalism as “1. the quality of having or showing the 
tenderness and warmth and affection of or befitting a mother” 
and “2. motherly care; behaviour characteristic of a mother; 
the practice of acting as a mother does toward her children.” 
In contrast, another on-line encyclopedia defines paternalism, 
as “the interference of a state or an individual with another 
person, against their will, and justified by a claim that the 
person interfered with will be better off or protected from 
harm.” Therefore, in what follows, the word paternalism is 
utilized following convention, but a better gender-neutral term 
is that of parentalism, which should evoke more neutral 
connotations and emotions than either maternalism or 
paternalism does.208 
Huang’s conclusion is strong: “a better gender-neutral term is that of 
parentalism,” in part because it “evoke[s] more neutral connotations and 
emotions than either maternalism or paternalism.”209 In short, a virtue of 
using the word parentalism is that its relatively neutral connotations help 
discussions of protect-by-restricting-choice laws to assess those laws on 
their merits with a minimum of distractingly loaded rhetoric, while 
nevertheless concisely capturing the similarities between such laws and 
                                                                                                                     
207 Several uses of paternalism in this plainly-gendered sense seem to have accentuated the negative 
connotations of paternalism by removing even the pretext that the paternalists restrict choice to protect. 
In the following examples, the male paternalists seem to be described as seeking to harm, rather than 
protect, women. See Knouse, supra note 49, at 139 (“[Women] are subordinated by the inherent 
paternalism [of mandatory ultrasounds]; they are manipulated by the compromised informed consent 
procedure and inherent pro-life bias . . . .”); London, supra note 49, at 405 (referring to an “attempt by 
the paternalistic, male-dominated medical establishment to exploit women’s reproductive capabilities to 
serve its own interests”); Schultz, supra note 49, at 2087 (“[M]ale bosses reinforce paternalistic authority 
by harassing or belittling women in traditionally female fields who dared to step out of their proper 
place.”). 
208 Huang, supra note 192, at 779–80 (footnotes omitted). 
209 Id. at 780. 
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parenting. Both such laws and parenting aim to protect people by restricting 
those people’s choices. 
IV. THE CASE FOR PARENTALISM AS THE GENDER-NEUTRAL SUBSTITUTE 
FOR “PATERNALISM” 
A. Many Legal Scholars Already Use Parentalism as a Gender-Neutral 
Substitute for “Paternalism” 
1. Introduction 
Thus far, this Article has summarized the widely accepted reasons for 
ordinarily using gender-neutral language, except when seeking to convey a 
gendered meaning and argued that this approach should be applied to 
paternalism. So, we should use that gendered word when conveying a 
gendered meaning, but otherwise, we should use a gender-neutral word. 
While writers could suggest a different gender-neutral word—anything from 
“protectivism” to “dictatorship”210—to describe laws or policies that protect 
people by restricting their choices, it is better to stick with parentalism in 
part because many legal scholars already use it as the gender-neutral 
replacement for paternalism. As the English language evolves through the 
word choices of millions of individual speakers and writers,211 and decades 
of those choices have made significant progress toward a good outcome 
(parentalism replacing paternalism as the usual word for laws protecting 
people by restricting them), prudence counsels for encouraging that progress 
by “going with the flow” of parentalism rather than trying to “turn back the 
tides” in its favor and diverting gender-neutral writers toward some different 
word. In other words, don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.  
2. Articles Citing Gender-Neutrality as the Reason for Using 
Parentalism 
This Article has argued that the widely accepted reasons for using 
gender-neutral language apply to the gendered word paternalism, so writers 
should use this word only when manifesting an intent to convey a gendered 
meaning and otherwise should use the gender-neutral parentalism. 
Fortunately, many legal scholars already do this, and several have cited 
gender-neutrality as their reason for using parentalism rather than 
paternalism. This perhaps began in 1987 with Marcy Strauss defining 
                                                                                                                     
210 See also Singer, supra note 194, at 282 (“Why ‘paternalism’? Why not ‘maternalism’? Or better 
yet, something gender-neutral like ‘dictatorship’? What is being conveyed by the paternalism moniker is 
control—the idea that decisions are being made by someone else. If that is the core notion, then a 
gender-neutral term would do as well.”). 
211 JOHN MCWHORTER, WORDS ON THE MOVE: WHY ENGLISH WON’T —AND CAN’T—SIT STILL 
(LIKE, LITERALLY) 1–5, 9–10 (1st ed. 2016). 
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parentalism “as ‘interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by 
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, 
interests or values of the person being coerced,’”212 and explaining “[t]he 
term paternalism is sex-linked; it is drawn from the role of the father in the 
family. Parentalism reflects, in a more egalitarian fashion, the same 
principles.”213   
Several other legal scholars also cite gender-neutrality as their reason 
for using the word parentalist rather than paternalist: 
• “A word that I now use consistently is parentalistic in 
place of paternalistic. As I use these words, I mean to 
convey a policy or practice of regulation by one 
person (or entity) of another, based on the belief that 
the authority figure, rather than the individual 
affected, can better determine what is in the best 
interests of the individual affected and can better make 
decisions for and protect that individual. While, 
historically, paternalism may not have been 
inaccurate, given that most perceived authority figures 
in either the public or private realm were (white) men, 
the meaning to be conveyed has also always connoted 
the relationship between a parent-figure and a 
child-figure. Therefore, parentalism is both accurate 
(in terms of the meaning I wish to convey) and 
gender-neutral.”214 
• “I say ‘parentalism’ rather than ‘paternalism’ in part 
to avoid the latter term’s connotations of officious 
intermeddling, but primarily to use a gender-neutral 
synonym. At least in my own experience, concern for 
another’s welfare combined with a claim of superior 
insight into the other’s needs can come from a parent 
of either sex.”215 
• “The first objection one might have to paternalism, as 
used here, is that it reproduces a highly gendered 
picture of power. It is possible, of course, to speak of 
parentalism rather than paternalism. Indeed, Locke 
himself suggests just such a formulation. The model 
                                                                                                                     
212 Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for 
Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 321 (1987). 
213 Id. at 321 n.34.  
214 Cathy J. Jones, Sexist Language: An Overview for Teachers and Librarians, 82 LAW LIBR. J. 
673, 679 n.18 (1990). 
215 Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 523 n.73 (1990).  
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of power suggested by the relation of parents and 
children is manifestly one to which women are clearly 
equal (if not stronger) claimants.”216 
• “[O]ut of parentalism (the gender-neutral version of 
‘paternalism’) . . . there are surely cases in which such 
parentalism is justified, such as when parents try to 
inculcate in their children a taste for education or 
classical music.”217 
In addition, a great many other legal scholars also use the gender-neutral 
parentalism to describe laws or policies aiming to protect people by 
restricting their choices. Several are quoted in the following subsections. 
3. Parentalism in Restricting Contractual Choices 
Many legal scholars use the word parentalism to describe laws or 
policies aiming to protect people by restricting their choices of contract 
terms: 
• “From early on, there was basic agreement that 
mandatory restrictions on freedom of contract could 
only be justified by efforts to protect parties inside the 
contract (parentalism) or parties outside the contract 
(externalities). Important disagreements remained as 
to the appropriate scope of these ‘exceptions.’”218 
• “[I]mmutable rules are justifiable if society wants to 
protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties 
outside the contract. The former justification turns on 
parentalism; the latter on externalities. Immutable 
rules displace freedom of contract. Immutability is 
justified only if unregulated contracting would be 
socially deleterious because parties internal or 
external to the contract cannot adequately protect 
themselves.”219 
• “[B]argains between contracting parties are not 
always Pareto efficient. Immutable contract rules are 
generally justified precisely for this reason, on 
                                                                                                                     
216 Jonathan Simon, Power Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1373 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
217 Jonathan Baron, Value Analysis of Political Behavior—Self-Interested: Moralistic: Altruistic : 
Moral, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1147 (2003). 
218 Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 886 (2003) (footnote 
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grounds of either parentalism or third-party 
effects.”220 
• “RUPA reaches a compromise between the 
‘libertarians’ who would like to see the parties held to 
their contracts and the ‘parentalists’ who support 
mandatory fiduciary duties . . . .”221 
• “RUPA was drafted with the intention of replacing 
parentalism with freedom of contract as the 
overarching principle of the Act. In doing so, the 
drafters assumed that, in most cases, partnership 
agreements are not adhesion contracts involving 
inequality of bargaining power.”222 
• “Anti-contractarians, called parentalists by some, 
argue that fiduciary duties owed by partners should be 
both broad and non-waivable.”223 
As the relevant contracting parties may be of any gender, these articles 
rightly use the gender-neutral parentalist rather than paternalist to describe 
the laws or policies aiming to protect them by restricting their choices. 
4. Parentalism in Restricting Consumers’ Choices 
Other law review articles use parentalism to describe laws or policies 
aiming to protect consumers or investors by restricting their choices: 
• “[L]aws [that] take that discretion away from the 
consumer” are “‘parentalist’ restrictions on 
autonomy.”224  
•  “[I]ndividuals are not autonomous subjects, but are 
highly susceptible to manipulation and persuasion. If 
individuals are so suggestible that some will 
predictably engage in clearly self-destructive behavior 
. . . then perhaps a more parentalist approach is in 
                                                                                                                     
220 Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of 
Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109, 175 (2002). 
221 Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as “Employees” 
Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 3, 44 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
222 Elisa Feldman, Your Partner’s Keeper: The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 1931, 1946–47 (1995). 
223 Samuel J. Samaro, The Case for Fiduciary Duty as a Restraint on Employer Opportunism Under 
Sales Commission Agreements, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 441, 487 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
224 Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With A Contractualist 
Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 214 n.97 (1998). 
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order. Regulation of cigarette advertising is among the 
best examples.”225  
• Risk of “hedge fund failures . . . can be an acceptable 
part of the larger array of risks investors understand to 
be a coincident part of their participation in the 
financial markets. Americans have never been fond of 
parentalism in law and the subprime mortgage 
situation does not present a compelling reason to now 
move against the grain.”226 
• “[R]etirement plan funding still operates under the 
substantial control of employers. Young employees 
especially . . . ought to bristle against the effective 
parentalism (employers and government have become 
co-parents) that still serves as the basic premise for the 
American retirement plan system. Many employees 
apprehensively wonder whether full Social Security 
benefits will exist when their turn to retire arrives.”227 
As the relevant consumers or investors may be of any gender, these 
articles rightly use the gender-neutral parentalist rather than paternalist to 
describe the laws or policies aiming to protect them by restricting their 
choices. 
5. Parentalism in Restricting Medical Patients’ Choices 
A variety of legal scholars use parentalism to describe laws or policies 
aiming to protect medical patients by restricting their choices: 
• “[One of] several ways of interpreting this possible 
exercise of exclusive power in withholding treatment 
[is] . . . as a parentalist exercise of professional power 
on behalf of the patient and/or family.”228 
• “Some critics maintain that, when doctors seek to 
determine medical futility unilaterally, they are 
engaging in an unjustifiable parentalist exercise of 
power.”229 
                                                                                                                     
225 Laura W. Brill, Note, The First Amendment and the Power of Suggestion: Protecting 
“Negligent” Speakers in Cases of Imitative Harm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 1007 n.152 (1994). 
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• “In the view of many clinicians, a reasonable 
risk-benefit calculation would not favor a decision to 
release an acutely psychotic patient without treatment, 
notwithstanding the patient’s own competent advance 
instructions. Releasing the patient would seem to 
require quite strong support for the value of patient 
autonomy over beneficent parentalism.”230 
• “[A physician healer] distinguished himself clearly 
from the other specialists [the patient] had seen, who 
said only, ‘You should immediately do what I 
recommend.’ But he also distinguished himself from 
the many physicians who mistakenly believe that the 
only way to avoid that brand of parentalism is to 
provide a raft of information at arms’ length—‘it’s 
your choice’—because they are afraid that they may 
unduly influence the patient’s decision simply by 
making a recommendation.”231 
• “[I]t would be beneficent parentalism at its worst to 
prejudge the likely outcome for a particular patient 
who could be given the opportunity to try protease 
inhibitors. Thus, all patients must be given a chance to 
benefit from the new therapies, as well as the support 
system necessary to make a chance worth taking.”232 
As the relevant medical patients may be of any gender, these articles 
rightly use the gender-neutral parentalist rather than paternalist to describe 
the laws or policies aiming to protect them by restricting their choices. 
6. Parentalism in Restricting Children’s Choices 
Some articles in law journals use parentalism to describe laws or 
policies aiming to protect children by restricting their choices: 
• “The right to marry can be limited if the state has a 
strong justification for doing so. A fourteen-year-old 
girl’s right to marry can be limited for standard 
parentalist reasons: the adolescent’s decisionmaking 
capacities are not fully developed, and she is prone to 
                                                                                                                     
230 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Overriding Psychiatric Advance Directives: Factors Associated with 
Psychiatrists’ Decisions to Preempt Patients’ Advance Refusal of Hospitalization and Medication, 31 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 77, 86 (2007). 
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poor choices, especially if made under the influence 
of an older lover.”233 
• “Bans on the tattooing of minors of course present a 
more complicated problem. In general, the state is 
permitted to exercise parentalism toward children. 
However, parentalism toward children is highly 
problematic with respect to freedom of dress because 
the exercise of freedom of dress is crucial as a child, 
given its special role in the development of social 
identity for children. . . . However, certain forms of 
body modification are rather long-lasting and, as a 
result, the experimentation that is normally associated 
with adolescent freedom of dress is fraught with 
permanence when it comes to tattooing, as well as 
body modifications more permanent than simple 
piercings.”234 
• “[P]arentalist legislation [that is intended to protect 
children (using the internet) in spaces where parents 
may not necessarily regulate online or in-game 
activity] is likely to disrupt speech and ultimately 
break up virtual world communities. . . . [T]his 
balkanization will isolate children from the very 
communities that protect them. . . . [T]he virtual 
worlds industry may be able to avoid this by 
developing better filters to protect children in virtual 
worlds.”235 
As the relevant children may be of any gender, these articles rightly use 
the gender-neutral parentalist rather than paternalist to describe the laws or 
policies aiming to protect them by restricting their choices. 
7. Parentalism in Restricting Choices by a Wide Variety of Other 
Parties 
Many other examples of legal scholarship use parentalism to describe 
laws or policies aiming to protect various types of people by restricting their 
choices: 
• “We teach, perhaps too much, that lawyers should 
respect their clients’ autonomy and that lawyers 
                                                                                                                     
233 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Three Cultural Anxieties Undermining the Case for Same-Sex 
Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 307, 314 (1998). 
234 Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, 
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should protect their clients’ rights to determine their 
own objectives. Parentalism is ‘out.’ Client autonomy 
and self-actualization are ‘in’—not merely as matters 
of the ethics of lawyering but also as a practical result 
of the economic nature of the attorney-client 
relationship.”236  
• “[R]ather than focusing on people’s poor judgment 
and decision making, governments should develop 
legal policy to foster people’s flourishing. Instead of 
working to stop an individual from making mistakes 
or suffering from cognitive biases, such positive 
parentalism seeks to build on people’s signature 
strengths and character virtues. The literature on loss 
aversion suggests that people might perceive 
interventions more favorably when they are framed 
not as an intrusion into one’s autonomy but instead as 
encouragement toward, or in aid of, a beneficial 
outcome.”237 
• “[A scholar] contrasted the independence that 
accompanies earning with the dependence of welfare 
beneficiaries who are ‘treated with that mixture of 
parentalism and contempt that has always been 
reserved for the dependent classes.’”238 
• “Requiring deeper or more detailed rational 
understanding [by a criminal defendant, waiving the 
right to counsel or pleading guilty, of the 
circumstances and consequences of those actions] 
risks parentalism, but requiring less risks an unjust 
outcome. I have a preference for limiting parentalism 
as much as possible and perhaps the Court’s 
recognition that the [criminal] defendant must actually 
waive his rights knowingly partially remedies the 
vagueness of the general test. On the other hand, 
defining knowing or intelligent is as vulnerable to 
manipulation as defining competence itself. In short, 
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evaluating any competence case is a normatively 
fraught and difficult enterprise.”239 
• “Some disabled individuals certainly face a possibility 
of neglect or abuse if left on their own. The problem 
is that, taken too far, professional behavior driven by 
the desire to help and protect disabled clients can 
diverge widely from the client’s goals of choice and 
satisfaction, reinforce learned helplessness, and 
amount to parentalism rather than support.”240 
• “Which of the two evils is more damaging? 
Proponents of outing assert that secrecy is more 
damaging than revelation, both to individual and 
community. But the parentalism of that argument 
marks the question as the wrong one to ask. Whether 
one is entirely open about his or her sexual orientation 
should be a personal choice made after an individual 
determination of the costs and benefits of each.”241  
• “Peck’s testimony reflects the Pentagon’s new 
‘kinder, gentler’ homophobia, which now justifies the 
gaylesbian exclusion as at least in part designed to 
protect lesbians and gay men. But beneath this 
perhaps sincere parentalism is the intimation that the 
armed forces cannot or will not control or regulate the 
violent impulses of their own troops. A gaylegal 
perspective contributes the insight that the violence 
Peck predicts is a self-fulfilling prophecy, a result of 
the military’s own policies.”242 
• “I argue against the use of autonomy as a basis for 
property-like fundamental rights in the body or any 
other form of property that would trump typical 
political concerns such as public health or even 
parentalism.”243 
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• “Perhaps the most difficult issue presented by 
sadomasochism is the legitimacy of parentalism: can 
the state regulate conduct that does physical harm to 
an individual, even if the individual has freely 
consented? The same issue is presented by the 
regulation of suicide, and a wide range of other 
personally harmful conduct.”244 
• “[T]he greater the coercion needing to be justified 
(say, in terms of how much liberty it undermines), the 
more important the behavior in question must be; and 
parentalism, for normal adults, is ruled out. According 
to this view, then, we may coerce people to do only 
what they would autonomously do if appropriately 
informed and fully rational.”245 
• “[A] true regulatory maze, representing parentalism, 
rigidness, and top-down regulation. In Atlantis, [by 
contrast,] the Queen has always favored individual 
freedom, flexibility, and self-regulation.”246 
• “Allowing [faculty with non-traditional 
appointments] to vote in committees and not in faculty 
meetings, as some schools do, simply smacks of 
parentalism.”247 
As the relevant protected-and-restricted parties may be of any gender, 
these articles rightly use the gender-neutral parentalist rather than 
paternalist to describe the laws or policies aiming to protect them by 
restricting their choices. 
8. Summary 
This Section has shown that a great many scholars use parentalism 
rather than paternalism to describe laws or policies aiming to protect people 
by restricting their choices. While one writer may be read to denigrate the 
gender-neutrality of parentalism as “politically correct,”248 several scholars 
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have cited gender-neutrality as their reason for using the gender-neutral 
word, and many other writers—perhaps accustomed to the norm of 
gender-neutral language—use parentalism without needing to explain their 
choice of words. This progress will hopefully continue as parentalism 
replaces paternalism, much as flight attendant is replacing stewardess and 
firefighter is replacing fireman.  
B. Legal Scholarship’s Other Use of the Word Parentalism 
While many legal scholars now often use parentalism to describe laws 
or policies that protect people by restricting their choices, other legal 
scholars use parentalism in a very different context, to describe views about 
the primacy of parents (as opposed to government) in raising children. A 
leading example is Stephen Gilles’ On Educating Children: A Parentalist 
Manifesto,249 which “provides a broad conception of parental authority 
[based on beliefs] that parents are more likely to act in their children’s best 
interest and that parental control over their children’s values must be 
superior to the state’s interest.”250 Several other scholars use the word 
“parentalist” similarly, for instance, explaining that “[f]or many parentalists, 
the right to parent is considered a time-honored staple of personal liberty 
deeply rooted in the common law and guaranteed by core constitutional 
principles,”251 or referring to “the disagreement between statists and 
‘parentalists’” “when it comes to government regulation of education.”252  
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Consequently, separate strands of legal scholarship use the word 
parentalist differently, with one strand using parentalist to refer to laws or 
policies aiming to protect people, usually adults, by restricting their choices, 
while another strand uses parentalist to describe supporters of parents (over 
government) in raising children. Fortunately, these two uses of the same 
word are unlikely to produce confusion because context quickly clarifies any 
ambiguity. If the context surrounding a particular use of parentalist does not 
involve children, then parentalist refers to laws or policies aiming to protect 
people, usually adults, by restricting their choices. And even if the context 
surrounding a particular use of parentalist involves children, that context 
nearly always quickly reveals whether parentalist describes: (A) a law 
restricting children’s choices, or (B) supporters of parents (over 
government) in raising children. In sum, the case for parentalist as the 
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looms large and lasts for a long time in most families as well as in the law. This typically is the case on 
both sides of the parent-child equation.”). 
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gender-neutral replacement for paternalist is not significantly weakened by 
a separate use of parentalist with a different meaning in other contexts.  
CONCLUSION 
The strong and widely accepted reasons for using gender-neutral 
language presumptively apply to the gendered word paternalism and its 
gender-neutral counterpart, parentalism. So, we should begin with a 
presumption for using the gender-neutral word parentalism, while using 
paternalism only when emphasizing the important relevance of gender or 
otherwise trying to convey a gendered meaning. Accordingly, many legal 
scholars define paternalism in an expressly gendered way—such as “the 
institutionalization of male dominance,”253 or an “ideology [that] teaches 
men to minimize women’s agency”254—or fittingly use paternalism to 
describe an attitude especially characteristic of men or directed primarily 
toward women. All these many uses of the gendered word paternalism are 
supported by the writers’ apparent intent to emphasize the important 
relevance of gender to the writers’ points. 
On the other hand, and despite the spread of gender-neutral language 
throughout our society and legal profession, many legal scholars continue to 
use the gendered word paternalism without indicating any important 
relevance of gender or otherwise manifesting intent to convey a gendered 
meaning. These many writers use paternalism rather than parentalism to 
describe laws or policies aiming to protect people (of all genders) by 
restricting their choices. For example, these writers cite “paternalism” as: 
• one of only two standard justifications for restricting 
freedom of contract or other private ordering;  
• a standard justification for restrictions on contractual 
choice, including the unconscionability doctrine, 
usury laws, the minimum wage, and countless 
regulations limiting the range of enforceable promises 
by consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and 
others; and 
• the basis for variants of like “libertarian paternalism” 
and “soft paternalism.”  
In each of these contexts, it would be better to use the gender-neutral 
word parentalism, unless the writer emphasizes the relevance of gender or 
otherwise manifests an intent to convey a gendered meaning. For example, 
a writer could justify using the gendered word paternalism by arguing that 
all our laws are gendered male so gendered language should be used to 
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discuss any law, including using paternalism to describe laws aiming to 
protect people of all genders by restricting their choices. Or a writer could 
justify using the gendered word paternalism by arguing (after citing 
sufficient empirical data) that protect-by-restricting-choice parenting is 
gendered male, so analogous protect-by-restricting-choice laws and policies 
are also gendered male.  
Absent one of those two plausible arguments justifying use of the 
gendered word paternalism, laws or policies aiming to protect people of all 
genders by restricting their choices are better described as examples of 
parentalism. While other legal scholars use the word parentalist, in a very 
different context, to describe views about the primacy of parents (as opposed 
to government) in raising children, this use of parentalist rarely produces 
confusion with use of parentalist to refer to laws or policies aiming to protect 
people, usually adults, by restricting their choices, because context quickly 
clarifies any ambiguity. So, the case for parentalist as the gender-neutral 
replacement for paternalist is not significantly weakened by a separate use 
of parentalist with a different meaning.  
 
